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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5848 
VILLAGE OF WHITEHALL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5848 
Included: All part-time Police Officers. 
Excluded: All full-time Police Officers, all other employees and elected 
officials of the Village of Whitehall. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 16,2009 
Albany, New York 
,/i 
Jerome L§fkowitz, OJ^lrman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF 
GREATER NEW YORK, LOCAL 100, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-26837 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF AND MEGINNISS, LLP (PETER ZWIEBACH of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE PRESIDENT 
(ROBERT K. DRINAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers 
Union of Greater New York, Local 100 (TWU) to a decision by the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge alleging that the New York City Transit Authority 
(NYCTA) violated §§209-a.1 (a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by unilaterally implementing new, more stringent standards limiting dual 
employment for certain unit employees.1 
The ALJ determined that NYCTA had acted in accordance with the terms of its 
existing dual employment policy and therefore had not unilaterally changed that policy in 
violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. 
1
 The TWU did not except to the ALJ's dismissal of the alleged violations of §§209-
a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
TWU excepts to the ALJ's decision, contending that, inter alia, the ALJ erred in 
finding that NYCTA had reserved the right to unilaterally implement heightened 
department-specific standards for off-duty employment and that NYCTA failed to meet 
its burden of demonstrating an objective need to implement the more stringent 
standards. NYCTA supports the ALJ's decision and argues, in the alternative, that the 
charge should be dismissed on the following grounds: the charge is not timely; the 
subject of the charge is nonmandatory; and TWU failed to demonstrate a breach of a 
binding past practice. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and conclude that NYCTA violated §209-
a.1 (d) of the Act when it implemented the stricter dual employment standards. 
FACTS 
TWU represents train operators, conductors and tower operators employed by 
NYCTA in its Division of Rapid Transit Operations (RTO). 
On April 19, 2000, NYCTA issued a Policy/Instruction for Dual Employment 
(2000 policy) applicable to employees of NYCTA, the Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) and the Staten Island Rapid Transit Authority 
(SIRTOA). 
NYCTA's dual employment policy states: "Full time employment with the 
Authority is deemed to be an employee's primary employment. All employees must be 
fit for duty during their working hours." 
The guidelines, contained in the 2000 policy, state: 
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Requests for dual employment will be reviewed and 
approved on a case-by-case basis. Employees' Department 
Heads, with the approvals of the Vice Presidents, Human 
Resources, Labor Relations and Law, may create and 
disseminate department-specific standards which may be 
more stringent than standards set forth in this P/l, as 
warranted to assure the safety of the public and of Authority 
employees. 
Employees who wish to engage in dual employment, and 
Division/Department Heads responsible for approval of dual 
employment requests, must determine whether the proposed 
outside employment complies with the following guidelines. 
In addition, the guidelines require all employees to ensure, inter alia, that: 
1. The dual employment shall not interfere with the proper 
and effective discharge of the employee's duties with the 
Authority or otherwise render the employee unfit for duty. 
2. The dual employment shall not create a conflict of 
interest or an appearance of a conflict in the performance 
of the employee's employment with the Authority. 
3. A current employee may not commence a secondary job 
until his/her dual employment has been approved in 
writing. 
The 2000 policy defines public safety positions and safety sensitive positions. 
Four positions are identified as public safety positions: bus operator, conductor, tower 
operator and train operator. Safety sensitive positions are described in the policy as: 
Positions, as defined by the Federal Transit Administration, 
in which the incumbents perform the following functions: 
operate, dispatch, control or maintain revenue service 
vehicles including when not in revenue service; operate 
nonrevenue service vehicles that require drivers to hold 
Commercial Driver's License, or provide security services 
that require the incumbent to carry a firearm. 
There are guidelines in the 2000 policy specifically applicable to public safety and 
safety sensitive positions: 
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1. The proposed outside employment may not result in total, 
combined work time that prevents the employee from 
having eight consecutive non-working hours in the 16-
hour period before reporting to work for the Authority. 
2. Employees who previously received approval for dual. 
employment must seek new approval within five (5) days 
of notification of an assignment change, either in their 
NYC Transit employment or their outside employment, 
that results in changes in work days, shift changes, work 
location changes, and/or work assignments. 
In addition, the four safety sensitive positions are subject to the following 
limitation under the 2000 policy guidelines: 
1. Dual employment requests may be approved for a 
maximum of one year; employees must resubmit 
requests for review and approval annually, or as required 
by Subsection IV.B.2. above. 
By letter dated February 8, 2006, NYCTA's Vice President, Office of Labor 
Relations advised TWU that NYCTA planned to issue and implement more stringent 
dual employment standards applicable to NYCTA train operators, conductors and tower 
operators and offered to negotiate the impact of the proposed standards, which were 
enclosed with the letter.2 The following day, TWU responded, by letter, objecting to 
NYCTA's plan to unilaterally implement stricter standards and asserting that the subject 
was a mandatory subject.3 In the letter, TWU referred to a series of arbitration 
decisions and awards sustaining separate grievances filed by a train operator and 
2
 Joint Exhibit 1 A. 
3
 Joint Exhibit 1B. 
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various conductors challenging NYCTA denials of their respective dual employment 
applications under the 2000 policy.4 
In a letter dated February 14, 2006, NYCTA's Vice President, Office of Labor 
Relations stated that: 
The proposed modifications to the dual employment 
standards for Train Operators, Conductors and Tower 
Operators are based upon providing a safer environment for 
our customers and employees. Management did not rely 
upon any safety studies, (emphasis added) 
On April 26, 2006, NYCTA issued the new more stringent standards for dual 
employment applicable only to train operators, conductors and tower operators which 
reads as follows: 
Train Operators, Conductors and Tower Operators are 
required to have eight consecutive non-working hours in the 
16-hour period before reporting to work for NYC Transit. In 
addition the following requirements apply: 
1. The eight consecutive hours of non-work time is exclusive 
of the commuting time to and from both the NYC Transit 
and the secondary job, i.e. such commuting/travel time 
cannot be included in calculating the eight consecutive 
non-working hours. 
2. No dual employment will be approved where the 
secondary employment plus commuting time is greater 
than four hours immediately preceding the employee's 
scheduled tour at NYC Transit. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 4A-4E. On November 2, 2005, one of those arbitration awards was 
judicially confirmed pursuant to CPLR §7510. Orrand Toussaint v NYCTA, Index No. 
109939/05 (Sup Ct, NY County 2005), nor. Joint Exhibit 5. In general, NYCTA 
Policy/Instructions are not incorporated into the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreements. An arbitrator, however, does have authority under the agreement to 
determine whether NYCTA has not complied with or has misinterpreted an 
unincorporated Policy/Instruction. Joint Exhibit 6, §2.1 (a); Charging Party Exhibit 2. 
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3. No dual employment will be approved where an 
employee may work more than six days in a calendar 
week including NYC Transit work plus the secondary job, 
i.e. an employee must have at least one NYC Transit 
RDO free from work each week. 
4. An employee requesting dual employment is required to 
list the estimated travel time to and from his/her NYC 
Transit and the secondary job. NYC Transit shall 
determine the reasonableness of the travel time listed. It 
is the responsibility of employees to notify NYC Transit 
immediately of changes in his/her work schedule at the 
secondary job or the commuting time to and from both 
jobs. 
NYCTA and TWU met to discuss the impact of the new standards but were 
unable to reach an agreement, and the new standards became effective on May 1, 
2006. 
During the hearing before the ALJ, Kevin O'Connell (O'Connell), RTO Division 
Chief Transportation Officer, testified that NYCTA implemented the more stringent 
standards for conductors, tower operators and train operators because they are safety 
sensitive positions and NYCTA wanted to ensure that employees in those positions had 
sufficient rest between jobs to avoid train accidents resulting from fatigue. 
The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the new dual 
employment standards are not applicable to bus operators, the fourth public safety 
position identified in the 2000 policy, or to train dispatchers, a safety sensitive position, 
with responsibilities for monitoring the movement of trains, responding to accidents and 
determining whether a train crew member is fit for duty when she or he reports for work. 
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DISCUSSION 
The charge alleges that NYCTA violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally implemented the new standards on May 1, 2006, and required train 
operators, conductors and tower operators to comply with them. 
The ALJ found that NYCTA had not acted unilaterally in implementing the new 
standards because the original 2000 policy reserved to NYCTA the authority to approve 
more stringent department-specific standards. 
TWU contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that NYCTA did not violate §209-
a.1 (d) of the Act because of a reserved unfettered right to unilaterally implement more 
stringent department-specific standards for dual employment. In addition, it asserts that 
the ALJ erred because NYCTA failed to meet its burden of demonstrating an objective 
need warranting the implementation of the more stringent standards for RTO 
conductors, tower operators and train operators. We agree. 
An employer's reservation of rights to act unilaterally with respect to a term and 
condition of employment constitutes a mandatory subject.5 When an employer acts 
consistent with an unchallenged policy explicitly reserving for itself the unfettered 
discretion to determine whether to continue a specific term and condition of 
employment, the employer's decision to act pursuant to the reservation of right is not 
considered to be unilateral under the Act.6 Unlike contract reversion to a specifically 
negotiated provision, however, a reservation of right in an employer's policy does not 
5
 See generally Sachem Cent Sch Dist, 21 PERB1J3021 (1988); County of Livingston, 
26 PERB H3074 (1993); Garden City Union Free Sch Dist, 27 PERB 1J3029 (1994). 
6
 State of New York (GOER and Dept of Health), 25 PERB 1J3005 (1992). Cf, New 
Berlin Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB fi3060 (1992). 
Case No. U-26837 -8-
stem from the employer satisfying its duty to negotiate under the Act.7 Therefore, the 
Board must strictly construe a policy-based reservation of right in order to effectuate the 
policies of the Act. 
In the present case, the 2000 policy guidelines did not reserve unfettered 
discretion to NYCTA to implement more stringent standards for dual employment 
on a department-specific basis. We interpret the phrase "as warranted" in the 
2000 policy as establishing a pre-condition to NYCTA's exercise of its discretion: 
the existence of facts and circumstances warranting more stringent standards for 
dual employment in a particular department. The need to discern such facts and 
circumstances by NYCTA under the 2000 policy, prior to implementation of the 
stricter standards, is confirmed by the requirement that any proposed change be 
reviewed and approved by various NYCTA Vice Presidents. 
Based upon the evidence in the record, we conclude that NYCTA failed to 
present sufficient evidence establishing that implementation of the at-issue standards is 
warranted consistent with its reservation of rights under the 2000 policy. Prior to the 
implementation of the stricter standards, NYCTA admitted to TWU that the standards 
were not based on safety studies. During the hearing before the ALJ, NYCTA did not 
present evidence of any events, since the promulgation of the 2000 policy, 
demonstrating that the policy had been ineffective as applied to conductors, tower 
operators and train operators in protecting the safety of the public and employees or 
that NYCTA had an immediate need to act unilaterally. Finally, NYCTA did not present 
any rationale for not applying the same new stricter standards to bus operators and train 
7
 NYCTA, 41 PERB 1J3014 (2008). 
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dispatchers, as it did to train and tower operators and train conductors, given that 
fatigue by employees in all five positions, defined as either a public safety or safety 
sensitive position, might adversely impact public transportation safety. Therefore, we 
reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the adoption of the stricter standards is consistent 
with the rights reserved by NYCTA in the 2000 policy. 
Based on this finding, we turn to NYCTA's alternative arguments in support of 
dismissing the charge. 
Contrary to NYCTA's claim, TWU's charge is timely because it was filed within 
four months of NYCTA's implementation of the reserved right announced in its 2000 
policy.8 
In addition, we reject NYCTA's claim that the subject matter of the unilateral 
change is nonmandatory because it has a relationship to NYCTA's mission of protecting 
the safety of the public. In general, employer restrictions on employee use of non-
working time for outside employment are mandatory subjects under the Act.9 In 
determining whether a unilateral change to a work rule violates the Act, we first identify 
the subject matter of the rule and then apply a balancing test by examining the evidence 
to determine whether the employer's interests in a particular mission-related rule change 
outweigh the impact that the change has on the employees' terms and conditions of 
B
 Middle County Teachers Assn, 21 PERB1J3012 (1988). 
9
 Local 589, IntlAssn of Fire Fighters, 16 PERB 1J3030 (1983); Ulster County Sheriff, 27 
PERB H3028 (1994); City of Buffalo (Police Dept), 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990); Hewlett-
Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist, 38 PERB 1J3006 (2005); City of Albany, 42 PERB 
1J3005 (2009). 
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employment.10 As we recently emphasized, the fact that a work rule may have some 
relationship "to an employer's mission does not permit the employer to act unilaterally in 
any manner it deems appropriate."11 
In the present case, the subject matter of NYCTA's 2000 policy is the ability of 
TWU unit employees to engage in off-duty work which then must be balanced against 
NYCTA's obligation to provide safe public transportation services. Based upon our 
review of the record, we find no credible evidence that the new more stringent dual 
employment standards for conductors, tower operators and train operators were 
necessary to meet the needs of providing safe transportation services, or that NYCTA 
faced a new or acute problem requiring the more stringent standards. As noted above, 
NYCTA did not present evidence establishing that the 2000 policy was ineffective in 
ensuring public safety, and it is undisputed that NYCTA did not rely on safety studies to 
establish and implement the new standards. Furthermore, NYCTA did not present any 
rationale for not applying the same stricter standards to bus operators and train 
dispatchers who have responsibilities where fatigue can adversely impact safe public 
transportation services.12 
City of Albany, supra note 9; Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 10. 
State of New York (Department of Transportation), 27 PERB 1J3056 (1994). 
11
 City of Albany, supra note 9, 42 PERB 1J3005, at 3007. 
12
 Based upon our conclusions today, we do not reach the issue of whether NYCTA 
violated an enforceable past practice under the Act. See generally, Chenango Forks; > 
CentSch Dist, 40 PERB H3012 (2007); City of Oswego, 41 PERB 1J3011 (2008); Inc Vil 
of Hempstead, 19 PERB 1J3002 (1986), reversed, Inc Vil of Hempstead v New York 
State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 20 PERB 1J7010 (Sup Ct Alb County 1987), reversed, 137 
AD2d 378, 21 PERB 1J7013 (1988), Iv denied, 72 NY2d 808, 21 PERB 1J7018 (1988), on 
remand, 22 PERB 1J4522 (1989). 
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Based on the foregoing, TWU's exceptions are granted and the decision of the 
ALJ is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that NYCTA shall forthwith: 
1. Rescind the April 26, 2006 dual employment standards for train operators, 
conductors and tower operators that became effective on May 1, 2006; 
2. Make whole any unit employees against whom the more stringent dual 
employment standards have been applied since its May 1, 2006 
implementation until such time as the new standards are rescinded with 
interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
3. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations normally used 
by it to post written communications for unit employees. 
DATED: June 16, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S\ Hite.lvfember 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) in 
the unit represented by Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, Local 100 
that NYCTA will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the April 26, 2006 dual employment standards for train operators, 
conductors and tower operators that became effective on May 1, 2006; 
2. Make whole any unit employees against whom the more stringent dual 
employment standards have been applied since its May 1, 2006 
implementation until such time as the new standards are rescinded with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. -
Dated By 
on behalf of NYCTA 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 891, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27711 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK LIPTON LLP (NEIL D. LIPTON of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (RUSSELL J. PLATZEK of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision by the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with respect to an improper practice charge filed by 
Local 891, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Local 891) on June 21, 
2007, alleging that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally imposed a three-hour limitation on the 
amount of leave time that bargaining unit members may take when they donate blood as 
part of a blood drive during the workday. 
The ALJ concluded that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it 
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unilaterally changed a past practice wherein bargaining unit employees were permitted 
to take varying amounts of leave time, up to a full day off, on workdays when they 
donated blood during blood drives. In finding a violation of §209-a.1(d), the ALJ 
rejected the District's contract reversion defense premised on a provision of the parties' 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) and District Personnel Memorandum 
No. 22, dated November 23, 1998 (Memorandum 22).1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District contends that the ALJ erred in failing to sustain the 
District's contract reversion defense, and in failing to conclude that Memorandum 22 
was distributed to Local 891 and bargaining unit members. Finally, the District asserts 
that the ALJ's decision is contrary to public policy because it results in an 
unconstitutional gift of public funds. Local 891 supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision.2 They are repeated here only 
as necessary to address the exceptions. 
Local 891 represents a bargaining unit of Custodian Engineers employed by the 
District in its schools and programs throughout New York City. 
Since 1951, Local 891 has sponsored, with the District's knowledge, a twice-annual 
blood drive involving bargaining unit members. The program is administered and organized 
by Local 891's blood bank committee. For most of its existence, Local 891's blood drive 
1
 The ALJ dismissed Local 891's allegation that the District violated §209-a.1(a) of the 
Act and Local 891 has not filed cross-exceptions to that portion of the ALJ's decision. 
2
 41 PERB 114575 (2008). 
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was conducted at the District's former Brooklyn headquarters in the Beaux Arts-style 
building at 110 Livingston Street. Local 891 now conducts the blood drive at its office in 
the Brooklyn Navy Yard and at satellite locations in Staten Island and Long Island. 
On days when Local 891 holds its blood drive, bargaining unit members initially 
report to work and then notify the District's Division of School Facilities if they will be 
leaving their assignment to donate blood. Since the inception of Local 891's blood 
drive, bargaining unit members documented when they left their work assignments to 
participate in the drive and took varying lengths of leave time, from one to eight hours. 
Although some Custodian Engineers returned to their work assignments after donating 
blood, this was not required by the District. 
The District participates in a separate blood donor program, entitled the New 
York City Employees' Blood Program, in conjunction with New York City's Department 
of Citywide Administrative Services (NYC DCAS). 
The parties' agreement is silent with respect to Local 891's blood donation drive 
and the District's separate blood drive. In addition, the agreement is silent with respect 
to the amount of leave time a bargaining unit employee may take when participating in 
either blood drive. Article V of the parties' agreement states in relevant part that: 
The Custodian Engineer shall be in attendance at 
his/her assignment for day school services from 
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, except on 
stated holidays, on the Friday after Thanksgiving 
when this day has been declared a non-school day 
by the Department of Education, on Rosh Hashanah 
and Yom Kippurwhen declared administrative office 
holidays and at such time as official permission has 
been granted for his absence.3 
3
 Joint Exhibit 1, Article V, p. 40. 
Case No. U-27711 -4-
The agreement also contains provisions with respect to custodial time records and 
vacation leave.4 
On November 23, 1998, the District's Division of Human Resources Director, 
Howard S. Tames, issued Memorandum 22 which states that the District, as a participant 
in the New York City Employees' Blood Program, is obligated to follow NYC DCAS's 
policies and regulations. Among the policies and regulations referenced in Memorandum 
22 is a limitation of three hours of compensatory time for a "productive blood donor who 
donates blood through the New York City Employee Blood Program during working 
hours."5 Following issuance of the policy, the prior practice of the bargaining unit continued 
with employees taking between one and eight hours of leave on blood donation days. 
In 2007, shortly after being appointed the District's Division of School Facilities 
Executive Director, John O'Connell (O'Connell), received an inquiry from Manhattan 
Borough Facilities Director, Timothy George, about the District's compensatory time 
policy for blood donations by Custodian Engineers. In response to the inquiry, 
O'Connell contacted the District's Division of Human Resources and obtained a copy of 
Memorandum 22. He also requested all five Borough Facilities Directors to examine 
the time records of Custodian Engineers and determine the amount of leave each 
employee utilized on blood donation days. The research conducted by the Facilities 
Directors revealed that over the past decade, Custodian Engineers took between one 
4
 Joint Exhibit 1, Article 111(15) pp. 27-28, Article VIII, p. 43.. 
5
 Employer Exhibit 1, 11(A)(1). 
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hour and eight hours of leave when donating blood.6 
On May 24, 2007, O'Connell sent an email to Local 891 President Robert 
Troeller and Vice President Matthew Wile limiting the amount of leave time for blood 
donations by Local 891 bargaining unit members to three hours, inclusive of travel time. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the District contends that it met its burden of demonstrating its 
contract reversion defense, contained in its answer, based upon Article V of the 
agreement and Memorandum 22. It does not contest that employee leave time to 
donate blood is a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act.7 Nor does it dispute 
that Local 891 met its burden of demonstrating a past practice under the criteria 
reiterated in Chenango Forks Central School District.8 
Following our review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the 
District did not meet its burden of proof with respect to its contract reversion defense. 
In order to meet its burden, the District is obligated to present evidence 
demonstrating that the parties negotiated a specific provision in their agreement which 
is reasonably clear on the subject presented and that the at-issue change by the District 
constitutes a reversion to that negotiated provision from an inconsistent past practice.9 
6
 Employer Exhibit 3. 
7
 See generally, City of Albany, 7 PERB1J3078 (1974) confirmed sub nom. City of 
Albany v Helsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dept 1975) affirmed, 38 NY2d 778, 
9 PERB H7005 (1975); Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth, 27 PERB 1J3076 (1994). 
8
 40 PERB P012 (2007). 
NYCTA, 41 PERB P014 (2008); NYCTA, 42 PERB 1J3012 (2009). 
Case No. U-27711 -6-
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that Article V of the agreement 
does not address the subject matter of the charge. While Article V conditions certain 
absences to the receipt of official permission, it does not address the number of hours a 
bargaining unit member is entitled to when participating in a blood drive. In construing 
Article V, we note that the parties in Article VIII explicitly set limitations on the amount of 
vacation leave earned by bargaining unit members. Therefore, we deny the District's 
contract reversion defense premised on the agreement. 
We next turn to the District's contract reversion defense premised on 
Memorandum 22, which is a policy unilaterally imposed by the District in 1998. A 
unilaterally imposed policy is not an agreement and it cannot form the basis for a 
contract reversion; it does not stem from the employer having satisfied its duty to 
negotiate under the Act.10 Therefore, when a subsequent enforceable practice is 
inconsistent with an employer's written policy, the employer can no longer rely on that 
policy to unilaterally end or modify the practice without violating §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
Where,.however, there is evidence establishing that the contours of the practice include 
an employer's unfettered discretion to continue or to modify the practice consistent with 
a prior explicit written reservation11 or evidence establishing an explicit waiver to 
negotiate by the employee organization,12 there would be no enforceable practice. 
10
 NYCTA, 42 PERB JJ3012 (2009). 
11
 State of New York (GOER and Dept of Health), 25 PERB TJ3005 (1992). 
12
 Onondaga-Madison BOCES, 13 PERB P015 (1980), confirmed sub nom. BOCES 
Sole Supervisor Dist v New York Pub Empl Rel Bd, 82 AD2d 691, 14 PERB 1J7025 (3d 
Dept, 1981); See, CSEA y Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 (3d Dep't 1982), 
aff'd, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB fl7007 (1984). 
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In the present case, Local 891 has demonstrated an enforceable past practice 
inconsistent with Memorandum 22's limitation of three hours of leave time for 
participating in a blood drive and, under the Act, the District cannot revert to that policy 
to unilaterally end or modify the binding past practice.13 Based upon the foregoing, the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally imposed a limitation on the 
amount of leave time for blood donations by bargaining unit employees because the 
limitation is inconsistent with the past practice. 
In light of the binding nature of the past practice since issuance of Memorandum 
22, the issue of whether it was distributed to Local 891 or to bargaining unit members is 
irrelevant to the present case. Therefore, we deny the District's exceptions over the 
question of the distribution of Memorandum 22. 
Finally, we reject the District's argument that the result of the ALJ's decision 
constitutes a violation of public policy because it constitutes an unconstitutional gift of 
public funds. It is well established that when an employer has a legal obligation to 
provide an employee with a benefit, whether as a result of a judgment, an arbitration 
award, an agreement or a decision finding a violation of the Act, that benefit does not 
constitute a prohibited gift.14 In the present case, there exists an enforceable past 
practice of bargaining unit employees taking leave for blood donations during their 
workday without any limitation on the amount of such leave time. Based upon the 
13
 Furthermore, Memorandum 22, by its express terms, is limited only to New York City 
Employee Blood Program. Therefore, the District's reliance on Memorandum 22 is 
without merit because the policy has no relevance to the undisputed decades-old leave 
practice with respect to the Local 891 blood drive. 
Antonopoulou v Beame, 32 NY2d 126 (1973); FIT, 41 PERB P010 (2008). 
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District's legal obligation under the Act to continue that term and condition of 
employment, remedying the District's violation does not constitute an unconstitutional 
gift of public funds. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision.15 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District shall forthwith: 
1. Rescind its notice dated May 25, 2007, which imposed a three-hour 
limitation on the amount of leave time a Local 891 bargaining unit 
member may take for blood donations and reinstate the practice in effect 
prior to May 25, 2007; 
2. Make Local 891 bargaining unit members whole, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate, for losses resulting from the District's implementation 
of its May 25, 2007 notice; 
3. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used 
to post notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome LefkSwitz, Chairman 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
15
 Board Member Hite took no part. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York, in the unit represented by Local 891, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, that the District forthwith will: 
1. Rescind its notice dated May 25, 2007, which imposed a three-hour 
limitation on the amount of leave time a unit member may take for 
blood donations and reinstate the practice in effect prior to May 25, 
2007; and 
2. Make unit members whole, with interest at the maximum legal rate, for 
losses resulting from the District's implementation of its May 25, 2007 
notice. 
Dated By 
on behalf of the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MANHASSET EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26091 
- and -
MANHASSET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CONRAD W. LOWER, Labor Relations Specialist, for Charging Party 
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (PETER A. WALKER and LORI M. MEYERS of 
) counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board from an order of remittitur from the Appellate 
Division, Third Department confirming our decision,1 finding that the Manhasset Union 
Free School District (District) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), but directing the Board, under the unique facts and circumstances 
of the present case, to reexamine our remedial order to meet specifically identified 
potential contingencies that may prevent or delay the District's compliance, to wit: the 
possible need for taxpayer approval for the purchase of buses to enable the District to 
1
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB1J3005 (2008), confirmed sub nom. and 
mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Em pi Rel Bd, 61 
AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009). 
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restore the at-issue unit work and the District's current contractual obligations with respect 
to that work. 
Following remittal from the Appellate Division, the District filed a letter with the 
Board dated June 1, 2009, requesting a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of remedy 
on the grounds that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refused to accept evidence on 
remedy and that there "may be additional and other reasons why PERB's original 
remedy was unreasonable and contrary to law." On June 2, 2009, the Board requested 
the parties to submit an offer of proof identifying any disputed facts requiring an 
evidentiary hearing and any legal issues requiring additional briefing in light of the 
Appellate Division's decision. 
In response to the Board's request, the District filed an offer on June 18, 2009, 
contending that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, at the present time, to determine 
which displaced Manhasset Educational Support Personnel Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (Association) bargaining unit members are entitled to reinstatement and to 
determine the amount of back wages and benefits that are due and owing to each 
displaced Association bargaining unit member as the result of the District's violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act. On June 18, 2009, the Association filed its offer asserting that 
the factual issues raised by the District can be raised and determined in the context of a 
compliance proceeding. 
Following careful examination of the offers made by the respective parties, we 
deny the District's request for an evidentiary hearing at the present time. To the extent . 
that the District now contends that the ALJ erred in excluding evidence related to 
remedy, it waived that issue when it failed to include the issue among its 59 exceptions 
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to the ALJ's decision.2 Furthermore, it is a well-established general Board practice to 
address factual issues with respect to the proper application of a remedial order to 
particular individuals during a compliance proceeding following judicial enforcement of a 
PERB remedial order pursuant to §213(a) of the Act.3 The District expressly 
acknowledged this procedural reality in its brief to the Appellate Division.4 
In its decision, the Appellate Division cited to County of Chautauqua,5 where the 
Board affirmed an ALJ's proposed remedial order in a subcontracting case where the 
respondent had sold the necessary equipment to perform the at-issue work and, 
therefore, may not have been able to restore the unit work that had been unlawfully 
transferred. To meet the facts and circumstances discerned from the record in that 
case, our remedial order directed that if the employer was unable to restore the at-issue 
unit work, it should make comparable unit work available to all displaced unit employees 
without loss of unit work to any current employees or, if no comparable unit work is 
available, to pay the displaced unit employees all lost wages and benefits until such 
time as the unit work becomes available. 
2
 Rules of Procedure (Rules), §213.2(b)(4); CSEA v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 
73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), 
confirmed sub nom. Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 40 PERB 
1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 
PERB H3006 (2008). 
3
 See, City of Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB 1J7021 (3d Dept 1983), 
app dismissed, 60 NY2d 859, 16 PERB fl7027 (1983), Iv denied 62 NY2d 602, 17 PERB 
H7009 (1984); Uniondale Union Free Sch Dist, 21 PERB 1J3044 (1988). 
4
 See, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, Appellant's 
Brief, p. 56. 
5
 21 PERB H4588 (1988), aff, 22 PERB H3016 (1989). 
Case No. U-26091 -4-
Upon remittitur from the Appellate Division, and after further review of the facts 
and circumstances in the present case, we conclude that the remedial approach in 
County of Chautauqua would best effectuate the policies and purposes of the Act and, 
therefore, we have modified our remedial order accordingly. Nothing in this decision 
should be construed as constituting a modification of our remedial policies and practices 
under the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District shall forthwith: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the 
work of employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Manhasset 
Educational Support Personnel Association (Association) including unit 
work consisting of the transporting of students from home to public school, 
to athletic and field events, and summer school, and the providing of 
maintenance and repair for District equipment; 
2. Restore all such subcontracted transportation services unit work to unit 
employees; 
3. Reinstate unit members with back wages and benefits suffered as a result 
of the subcontracting of the unit work, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate, less interim earnings; 
4. In the event that restoration of the unit work to unit employees is impossible 
due to taxpayer disapproval of the purchase of buses and other equipment 
necessary to restore the unit work, make comparable work available to all 
displaced unit members, without loss of work to any current unit 
employees, or pay the displaced unit employees all back wages and 
benefits, with interest at the maximum legal rate, less interim earnings, until 
such time as comparable unit work becomes available; 
5. In the event that restoration of unit work is delayed due to present District 
contractual obligations, pay the displaced unit employees all back wages 
and benefits, with interest at the maximum legal rate, less interim earnings, 
as the result of the subcontracting of the work until such time as the unit 
work is restored; 
6. Negotiate in good faith with the Association concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment of unit employees; and 
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7. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
7
 Robert S.'Hite, Member 
U//> .,/Y/' 
•v'NI 
Sheila/S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND O R D E R OF THE 
NEW Y O R K STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT A C T 
we hereby notify all employees of the Manhasset Union Free School District in the unit 
represented by the Manhasset Educational Support Personnel Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, that the Manhasset Union Free School District forthwith will: 
1. Refrain from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the work of employees in the bargaining 
unit represented by the Manhasset Educational Support Personnel Association (Association) 
including unit work consisting of the transporting of students from home to public school, to athletic 
and field events, and summer school, and the providing of maintenance and repair for District 
equipment; 
2. Restore all such subcontracted transportation services unit work to unit employees and reinstate 
unit employees with back wages and benefits suffered as a result of the subcontracting of the unit 
work, with interest at the maximum legal rate, less interim earnings; 
3. In the event that restoration of the unit work to unit employees is impossible due to taxpayer 
disapproval of the purchase of buses and other equipment necessary to restore the unit work, 
make comparable work available to all displaced unit members, without loss of work to any current 
unit employees, or pay the displaced unit employees all back wages and benefits, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate, less interim earnings, until such time as comparable unit work becomes 
available 
4. In the event that restoration of unit work is delayed due to present District contractual obligations, 
pay the displaced unit employees all back wages and benefits, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate, less interim earnings, as the result of the subcontracting of the work until such time as unit 
work is restored; 
5. Negotiate in good faith with the Association concerning the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees. 
Dated By 
(on behalf of Manhasset Union Free School District) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KEVIN BIEGEL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28834 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
KEVIN BIEGEL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Kevin Biegel (Biegel) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing, as deficient, an improper practice charge filed on December 23, 2008, 
alleging that the State of New York (State) violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (g) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) based upon a series of alleged acts by 
the State commencing in November, 2005 and continuing through November 18, 2008, 
when Biegel's second request for reinstatement to his former position was denied. 
After Biegel filed two amendments to the charge, the Director dismissed the 
pleading, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), based upon the 
following grounds: Biegel lacks standing to pursue an alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) 
of the Act; the amended charge fails to allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would 
establish timely and meritorious claims under §§209-a.1(a) and (g) of the Act.1 
1
 42 PERB 5T4523 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Biegel excepts to the Director's dismissal of his charge asserting, inter alia, that 
his amended charge alleges sufficient facts to set forth timely and meritorious claims 
under §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (g) of the Act. In support of his exceptions, Biegel asserts 
that the State has not provided him with an explanation for its refusal to reinstate him. 
Furthermore, he alleges that the State has violated his rights under the United States 
and New York State Constitutions.2 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Biegel's arguments, 
we affirm the Director's dismissal of the charge. 
FACTS 
For purposes of reviewing the dismissal of the charge, we will accept the 
allegations as being true and grant those allegations all reasonable inferences.3 
In September 2006, Biegel was employed by the State as a correction officer at 
Greene Correctional Facility. On September 11, 2006, the State issued a notice of 
discipline seeking to terminate him for alleged acts of misconduct toward an inmate. 
These alleged acts also formed the basis for criminal charges against Biegel which 
resulted in his arrest on September 3, 2006. Pending the outcome of the disciplinary 
charges, Biegel was suspended from his position. 
The New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, 
Inc. (NYSCOPBA) filed a disciplinary grievance on his behalf on September 11, 2006 
and submitted an appeal to disciplinary arbitration on October 25, 2006. The 
2
 In his exceptions, Biegel also requests documents pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL). His FOIL request has been referred to our Records Access 
Officer. 
3
 Dutchess Community Coll, 41 PERB ^3029 (2008). 
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scheduling of the arbitration was postponed, however, pending the outcome of the 
criminal charges. 
Following Biegel's acquittal of the criminal charges in November 2007, 
NYSCOPBA and the State commenced settlement discussions with respect to the 
pending notice of discipline. Biegel claims that during those discussions, the State 
promised to remove the notice of discipline from his personnel file as part of the 
settlement. On January 4, 2008, Biegel entered into a settlement agreement with the 
State resolving the notice of discipline. Under the agreement, Biegel retired from State 
service in exchange for payment of back wages. 
Between August and December 2008, Biegel sent a series of letters to State 
officials asserting, inter alia, that he was falsely accused of misconduct toward the 
inmate and that the settlement and his decision to retire had been coerced. In his 
various letters, Biegel stated that he was rescinding his retirement and requested 
reinstatement to his former position, a written apology, reimbursement for his legal fees, 
and the removal of the notice of discipline from his personnel file. 
On September 10, 2008, the State sent him a letter denying his requests for an 
apology, reimbursement for his legal fees and the removal of the notice of discipline. 
On October 24, 2008 and November 18, 2008, the State sent letters to Biegel denying 
his request for reinstatement. In the November 18, 2008 letter, Commissioner Brian 
Fischer (Fischer) set forth the primary factors the State considers in determining 
requests for reinstatement, and he informed Biegel that the denial of his request was 
made following another review of his personnel file. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is required to review all newly 
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filed charges as a means of weeding out facially deficient claims.4 Under the Rule, the 
Director has the authority to dismiss a charge on the grounds that it fails to allege facts 
that, as a matter of law, constitute a violation under §209-a of the Act or fails to allege 
facts that would establish that the purported violation took place within four months prior 
to the filing of the charge. 
In the present case, we affirm the dismissal of Biegel's claim that the State 
violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act because it is well-settled that an individual lacks 
standing to pursue such an alleged violation.5 
Next, we examine Biegel's challenge to the Director's dismissal of certain claims 
as untimely. Pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules, an improper practice charge must 
be filed within four months from when a charging party knew or should have known of 
the alleged violation of the Act.6 Granting all reasonable inferences to Biegel's 
•\ 
allegations, as we must, he alleges that the State violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Act by 
coercing him on January 4, 2008 to retire as part of the disciplinary settlement, 
thereby constructively discharging him from his position.7 Based upon the fact that the 
charge was filed more than four months after the settlement and his retirement, we 
affirm the dismissal of that aspect of the charge. 
4
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
5
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 38 PERB 1J3012 
(2005). 
6
 TWU (Abraham), 36 PERB P008 (2003). 
7
 Holland Patent Cent Sch Dist, 32 PERB 1J3041(1999); State of New York (SUNY 
Oswego), 36 PERB 1J3015 (2003), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 8 AD3d 796,37 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dept 2004); Morris v Schroder Capital 
) Mgt Intl, 7 NY3d 616, 621 (2006) ("Constructive discharge occurs 'when the employer, 
rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so 
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation'")(citations 
omitted). 
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We also affirm the Director's dismissal of the alleged violation of §209-a.1(g) of 
the Act. The amended charge does not allege that, within four months of the filing of 
his charge, the State denied a request by Biegel for NYSCOPBA representation during 
questioning, in which it reasonably appeared that he may be subject to potential 
disciplinary action. Although §209-a.1(g) of the Act is entitled to a liberal construction, 
the amended charge fails to include any of the necessary elements to state a timely 
and meritorious violation of that provision.8 
Furthermore, we affirm the Director's dismissal of Biegel's remaining alleged 
violations of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. In State of New York (SUNY Oswego),9 the Board 
recognized that an employer's refusal to permit the withdrawal of a resignation can 
violate §209-a.1(a) of the Act if the denial is motivated by anti-union animus. Biegel 
has not plead any facts which, if proven, would establish that the State was improperly 
motivated when it refused his requests for reinstatement, an apology, reimbursement of 
legal fees and the removal of the notice of discipline.10 There are no allegations in the 
amended charge that even suggest a causal connection between the State's denial of 
Biegel's requests and his prior representation by NYSCOPBA with respect to the 
disciplinary charges. In addition, contrary to the exceptions, the State did provide 
Biegel with an explanation for its refusal to reinstate him in Fischer's November 18, 
2008 letter. 
Finally, we deny Biegel's exceptions which assert that the State violated the 
8
 Tarrytown PBA, 40 PERB 1J3024 (2007). See also, City of Albany, 42 PERB P005 
(2009). 
9
 Supra note 7. 
10
 State of New York (Office of Court Administration), 32 PERB 1J3063 (1999); State of 
New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB P033 (2008). 
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United States and New York State Constitutions. Pursuant to §§205.5(d) and 209-a.1 
of the Act, PERB has the authority to determine whether an improper employer practice 
has occurred; we do not have subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
against an employer. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Biegel's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York . 
Jerome Lefkowitz, C 
MLuJ^f ^Jr 
—s C - AyiV Robert S. Hite, Member 
J * — — M 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KEVIN BIEGEL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28885 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
KEVIN BIEGEL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Kevin Biegel (Biegel) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing, as deficient, an improper practice charge, as amended, filed on January 20, 
2009 alleging that the State of New York (State) violated §209-a.1(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused his requests to be reinstated to 
his former position. 
Following an initial review of the amended charge, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director dismissed the amended charge concluding 
that it failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim of a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the 
Act .1 
1
 42 PERB H4524 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Biegel excepts to the Director's decision asserting, inter alia, that his amended 
charge sets forth sufficient facts to state a claim of a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
In support of his exceptions, Biegel asserts that the State has not provided him with an 
explanation for refusing to reinstate him. Furthermore, he alleges that the State 
violated his rights under the United States and New York State Constitutions.2 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Biegel's arguments, 
we affirm the Director's dismissal of the amended charge. 
FACTS 
For purposes of reviewing the dismissal of the amended charge, we will accept 
the allegations as true and grant those allegations all reasonable inferences.3 
In 1990, Biegel commenced employment as a correction officer at the Greene 
Correctional Facility. In September 2006, the State issued a notice of discipline alleging 
that Biegel had engaged in misconduct. During settlement discussions with the State, 
Biegel was represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc (NYSCOPBA). In January 2008, the notice of discipline 
was resolved, and Biegel retired as part of the settlement. 
On October 16, 2008, Biegel informed the State that he was rescinding his 
decision to retire and requested reinstatement to his former position. In response, the 
Director of Human Resources of the New York State Department of Correctional 
Services Daniel F. Martuscello III, wrote Biegel on October 24, 2008, stating that 
2
 In his exceptions, Biegel also requests documents pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL). His FOIL request has been referred to our Records Access 
Officer. 
3
 Dutchess Community Coll, 41 PERB P029 (2008). 
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Biegel's request had been reviewed and that a determination had been made that his 
reinstatement would not be in the Department's best interests. Following a second 
request for reinstatement, Commissioner Brian Fischer (Fischer) wrote Biegel on 
November 18, 2008. In his letter, Fischer identified the primary factors that the State 
considers in determining requests for reinstatement, and informed Biegel that the denial 
of his request had been made following another review of his personnel file. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is responsible for reviewing all 
newly filed charges as a means of weeding out facially deficient charges.4 Under the 
Rules, the Director has the authority to dismiss a charge on the grounds that it fails to 
allege facts that, as a matter of law, constitute a violation under §209-a of the Act. 
Granting all reasonable inferences to the allegations in the amended charge, it is 
Biegel's position that the State violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act when it refused to permit 
him to withdraw his resignation. In State of New York (SUNY Oswego),5 the Board 
recognized that an employer's refusal to permit the withdrawal of a resignation can 
violate §209-a.1(a) of the Act if the denial is motivated by anti-union animus. In his 
amended charge, however, there are no allegations which even suggest a causal 
connection between the State's denial of Biegel's requests for reinstatement and his 
prior representation by NYSCOPBA with respect to the disciplinary charges6 
Furthermore, contrary to Biegel's exceptions, in Fischer's November 18, 2008 letter, the 
4
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB P023 (2007). 
5
 36 PERB P015 (2003), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bel, 8 AD3d 796,37 PERB H7002 (3d Dept 2004). 
6
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB P033 (2008). 
I 
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State did provide him with an explanation for its refusal to reinstate him. 
Finally, we deny Biegel's exceptions which assert that the State violated the 
United States and New York State Constitutions. Pursuant to §§205.5(d) and 209-a.1 
of the Act, PERB has the authority to determine whether an improper employer practice 
has occurred; we do not have subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
against an employer. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Biegel's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
j£j«J> / ^&t 
Robert S. Hfte, Member 
s2&-^^ 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KEVIN BIEGEL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28886 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
KEVIN BIEGEL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Kevin Biegel (Biegel) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing, as deficient, an improper practice charge, as amended, filed on January 20, 
2009, which alleges that the State of New York (State) violated §209-a..1 (a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused his request to remove a 
September 11, 2006 notice of discipline and other derogatory materials from his 
personnel file in violation of the collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) between 
the State and the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA). 
Following an initial review of the amended charge, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director dismissed the amended charge on the 
grounds that PERB lacks jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a collectively negotiated 
agreement and that the amended charge fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim 
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of a violation of §209-a. 1 (a) of the Act.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
Biegel excepts to the Director's decision asserting, inter alia, that his amended 
charge sets forth sufficient facts to state a claim of a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act 
based upon the State's refusal to remove the notice of discipline from Biegel's 
personnel file. Furthermore, he alleges that the State violated his rights under the 
United States and New York State Constitutions when it denied his request for 
reinstatement.2 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Biegel's arguments, 
we affirm the Director's dismissal of the amended charge. 
FACTS 
For purposes of reviewing the dismissal of the amended charge, we will accept 
the allegations as being true and grant those allegations all reasonable inferences.3 
Under the State - NYSCOPBA agreement, any adverse material contained in a 
personnel file over a year old, may be removed upon an employee's written request. 
On September 11, 2006, the State issued a notice of discipline against Biegel 
alleging various acts of misconduct toward an inmate. On September 10, 27, and 
October 2, 2008, Biegel requested the State to remove the notice of discipline from his 
personnel file on the grounds that it contained false allegations. In addition, he 
requested that the "Stackhouse file" be removed because it includes documents which 
1
 42 PERB H4525 (2009). 
2
 In his exceptions, Biegel also requests documents pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL). His FOIL request has been referred to our Records Access 
Officer. 
3
 Dutchess Community Coll, 41 PERB P029 (2008). 
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also contain false allegations against him. On October 31, 2008, Biegel sent another 
letter to the State alleging that he had been told by NYSCOPBA representatives that 
the notice of discipline was going to be dismissed and removed from his personnel file. 
The State has not complied with Biegel's multiple requests for the removal of the 
derogatory materials. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is responsible for reviewing all 
newly filed charges as a means of weeding out facially deficient charges.4 Under the 
Rules, the Director has the authority to dismiss a charge on the ground that it fails to 
allege facts that, as a matter of law, constitute a violation under §209-a of the Act. 
Granting all reasonable inferences to the allegations in the amended charge, as 
we must, there are no allegations which can be reasonably construed as stating a claim 
that the State's failure to honor his requests for the removal of the derogatory materials 
is unlawfully motivated in violation of §209-a.1(a). In addition, there are no allegations 
which even suggest a causal connection between the State's denial of his requests and 
Biegel's representation by NYSCOPBA with respect to the disciplinary charges.5 
Finally, we deny Biegel's exceptions which assert that the State has violated the 
United States and New York State Constitutions. Pursuant to §§205.5(d) and 209-a.1 
of the Act, PERB has the authority to determine whether an improper employer practice 
has occurred; we do not have subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
against an employer. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Biegel's exceptions and affirm the 
4
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
5
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB 1J3033 (2008). 
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decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk^Witz, C/Tairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
7 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Highland Falls 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) and cross-exceptions filed by the Village of 
Highland Falls (Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on two 
improper practice charges, as amended, filed by the Village alleging that the PBA 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by including a General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c 
proposal in its interest arbitration petitions on behalf of separate PBA units of full-time 
and part-time Village police officers.1 
Following submission of the cases on a stipulated record, the ALJ rejected the 
Village's argument that the PBA's GML §207-c proposal is a unitary demand. He, 
CASE NOS: U-26843 
U-26844 
1
 40 PERB 1J4525 (2007). 
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therefore, analyzed each challenged portion of the proposal and concluded that the 
PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act because the proposal contains a nonmandatory 
dispute resolution mechanism in §11 of the proposal with respect to such issues as 
initial eligibility determinations, light duty assignments and the termination of benefits 
under GML §207-c. Specifically, the ALJ found §§4, 6(A), 7(B), 7(C), 10(1), and 14 to 
be nonmandatory because disputes under each section would be subject to an arbitral 
hearing applying traditional arbitration standards, pursuant to §11 of the proposal, rather 
than an arbitral review procedure limited to standards and procedures equivalent to that 
applied in a Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 78 proceeding.2 The ALJ, 
however, rejected the Village's contention that §§3, 8 and 9 of the proposal, along with 
the remaining portions of §§4, 6, 7 and 10, are nonmandatory. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the PBA contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find the 
proposed arbitral procedure to be mandatory, based upon the decisions in Watertown 
Police Benevolent Association (Watertown),3 and erred in analyzing the proposal based 
upon two subsequent decisions in Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters' Association, 
2
 The ALJ reached his conclusion following an analysis of prior precedent with respect 
to the negotiability of GML §207-c dispute resolution procedures. See, Watertown PBA, 
30 PERB1J3072 (1997), confirmed sub nom. City of Watertown v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 31 PERB 1J7013 (Sup Ct Albany County 1998), revd 263 AD2d 797, 32 
PERB H7016 (3d Dept 1999), revd 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007 (2000) (hereinafter 
Watertown); Poughkeepsie Prof Firefighters' Assn, Local 596, IAFF, 33 PERB P029 
(2000) (Poughkeepsie /); Poughkeepsie Firefighters' Assn, Local 596, IAFF 36 PERB 
1J3014 (2003), annulled sub nom. Poughkeepsie Prof Firefighters' Assn, Local 596, 
IAFF v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 36 PERB 1J7016 (Sup Ct Albany County 
2003) revd, 16 AD3d 797, 38 PERB 1J7005 (3d Dept 2005) affdQ NY3d 514, 39 PERB 
1J7005 (2006) (Poughkeepsie II.) As will be seen, infra, we do not need to reexamine 
the holdings in Watertown, Poughkeepsie I and Poughkeepsie II in order to determine 
whether the PBA's proposal is mandatory. 
3
 Supra note 2. 
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Local 596, IAFF (Poughkeepsie I and Poughkeepsie II).4 The PBA supports the ALJ's 
decision in all other respects. 
The Village supports the ALJ's decision to the extent that he found the proposed 
arbitral procedure to be nonmandatory based upon the decisions in Poughkeepsie I and 
Poughkeepsie II. The Village, however, cross-excepts to the ALJ's finding that the 
PBA's proposal is not unitary and asserts that the ALJ erred in finding §§3, 7 and 9 of 
the proposal, along with the remaining portions of §§4, 6 and 10 to be nonmandatory. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we reverse, in part, but affirm the decision of the ALJ finding that the PBA violated 
§209-a.2(b)oftheAct. 
REQUEST FOR AMICI BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 
Following the filing of the PBA's exceptions and the Village's response and 
cross-exceptions, the Board issued a notice inviting interested entities to submit amid 
briefs. In response to the Board's request, five amici filed separate briefs. Thereafter, 
the PBA and Village each submitted supplemental briefs responding to the arguments 
raised in those briefs. In addition, the Board held oral argument. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts, including the full text of the PBA's GML §207-c proposal, are 
fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and appendix5 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to determine issues raised by the parties. 
The PBA is the certified representative for two separate bargaining units 
composed respectively of Village full-time police officers and Village part-time police 
4
 Supra note 2. 
5
 Supra note 1, 40 PERB 1J4525 at 4577-4583. 
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officers. The collective bargaining agreements between the PBA and the Village 
expired on May 31, 2004. Following an impasse in negotiations, the PBA filed petitions 
for compulsory interest arbitration, pursuant to §204 of the Act, which included the 
identical GML §207-c proposal entitled "Proposed New Agreement-General Municipal 
Law Section 207-c Procedure." The proposal is comprised of 14 numbered paragraphs 
which, inter alia, set forth the application procedure for GML §207-c benefits (§3), 
establishes a Claims Manager position and defines the authority and duties of that 
position (§§4, 6, 7, 9 and 10), creates procedures with respect to medical examinations 
and treatment (§6), light duty assignments (§7) and termination of benefits (§10). 
Finally, §11 provides for final and binding arbitration with respect to disputes between 
the parties over various issues including determinations made by the Claims Manager. 
DISCUSSION 
Our discussion begins with the Village's cross-exception contending that the ALJ 
erred in failing to conclude the PBA's proposal is a nonmandatory unitary demand. We 
agree with the Village. 
The Board has defined a unitary demand as a proposal containing multiple 
sections or paragraphs which cannot be reasonably understood to constitute severable 
and independent proposals. If a proposal is a unitary demand, it is nonmandatory if any 
portion of it is found to be nonmandatory.6 
Following our review of the PBA's GML §207-c proposal, we conclude that it is a 
unitary demand. The terms and structure of the proposal demonstrate that it is intended 
to be a comprehensive and non-severable single proposal with respect to GML §207-c 
6
 Pearl River Union Free Sen Dist, 11 PERB 1J3085 (1978); City of Oneida PBA, 15 
PERB 1J3096 (1982); City of Newburgh, 18 PERB 1J3065 (1985), confirmed sub nom. 
City of Newburgh v Newman, 19 PERB 1J7005 (Sup Ct Albany County 1986). 
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benefits. The proposal's title makes clear that it is aimed at establishing a "new 
agreement" by creating a "Section 207-c Procedure" for such benefits. In §1, the 
proposal specifies that the procedure set forth in the remaining 13 paragraphs "shall 
regulate the application and benefit award process for 207-c benefits."7 (emphasis 
added). Section 14, at the end of the proposal, states: 
"The intent is to read this procedure in conformity with 
General Municipal Law Section 207-c. In the event that 
General Municipal Law Section 207-c is amended either 
party may, upon written notice to the other, reopen 
negotiations of this procedure to address such change in the 
statute.8 (emphasis added). 
Between §§1 and 14, there are a dozen sections specifying, inter alia, the 
creation of a "Claims Manager" and defining the duties and authority of that position on 
behalf of the Village. Those duties run from the initial application for benefits through 
the Claims Manager's determinations with respect to initial eligibility, medical treatment, 
light duty and termination of benefits. Each of those determinations would be subject to 
review through an arbitral procedure set forth in §11. 
Pursuant to §2(d), the Village would be limited to designating a single individual 
to perform the duties the Claims Manager under the proposal. In §4, the proposal 
delineates the powers that would be conferred upon the Claims Manager for rendering 
an initial eligibility determination within a 30-day calendar period specified in the 
proposal. Among those powers would be the ability of the Claims Manager to order a 
claimant and other witnesses to provide testimony. At the same time, §4 states that "[a] 
determination on initial eligibility shall be made within a reasonable time, based upon 
7
 Supra note 1, 40 PERB 1J4525 at 4578. 
8
 Supra note 1, 40 PERB |f4525 at 4582. 
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the investigation without holding a hearing." (emphasis added) In any event, a public 
employer's determination as to which managerial duties should be assigned to which 
managerial employee or employees is a managerial prerogative.9 While the duties of a 
risk or claims manager might be a term and condition of employment of that manager, 
they are not the duties of PBA unit employees subject to that manager's supervision or 
determinations.10 
In 1986, in City of Schenectady,^ the Board held that the creation of a risk 
manager position to render determinations and to oversee the procedures related to 
those determinations, under a GML §207-c procedure, is a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiations. The holding in City of Schenectady is consistent with the well-established 
principles under the Act that the creation of a position, along with the essential duties, 
responsibilities and tasks of that position, are nonmandatory.12 
In light of our conclusion that the PBA's unitary demand is nonmandatory, we do 
not reach the remaining issues raised by the parties in the exceptions and cross-
exceptions, including whether the proposed arbitral process is mandatory under prior 
precedent and the policies of the Act, and whether certain aspects of the proposal are 
9
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of New York, 5 PERB1J3054 (1972). 
10
 Supra note 9. 
11
 19 PERB 1J4544, affd 19 PERB 1J3051 (1986), confirmed sub nom. City of 
Schenectady v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 135 Misc2d 1088, 19 PERB 1J7023 
(Sup Ct Albany County 1986) affd 132 AD2d 242, 20 PERB 1J7022 (3d Dept 1987), Iv 
denied, 71 NY2d 803, 21 PERB 1J7007 (1988); Poughkeepsie I, supra note 2. 
12
 Waverly Cent Sch Dist, 10 PERB 1J3103 (1977); Churchville-Chili Cent Sch Dist, 17 
PERB 1J3055 (1984); Town of Henrietta, 25 PERB TJ6501 (1992). 
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mandatory under City of Cohoes™ because they reiterate statutory obligations under 
GML §207-c. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ's decision is reversed, in part, but affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association negotiate in good faith by 
withdrawing its respective GML §207-c proposals from interest arbitration. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowjfz, Ch 
Robert S.Hife, Member 
/ / <<= 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
13
 31 PERB P020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes v 
Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 
1J7019 (3d Dept2000), Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERBH7018 (2001). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Fashion Institute of 
Technology (FIT), and cross-exceptions filed by the United College Employees of the 
Fashion Institute of Technology (UCE), to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a unit clarification and unit placement petition filed by UCE, seeking a 
determination that the positions of Executive Studies Program Director, Deputy Director 
of the Museum at FIT (Deputy Director), and Director of Environmental Health and 
Safety Compliance (Health and Safety Director), are already encompassed within the 
UCE bargaining unit or should be placed in that unit. Following five days of hearings, 
the ALJ issued a decision dismissing UCE's unit clarification petition but granting the 
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unit placement petition, in part.1 The ALJ concluded that the Deputy Director position 
should be placed into the UCE bargaining unit but denied the placement of the 
Executive Studies Program Director and Health and Safety Director positions into the 
UCE bargaining unit on the grounds that the incumbents in those positions are 
managerial under the criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act).2 
EXCEPTIONS 
FIT challenges the ALJ's decision to place the Deputy Director into the UCE 
bargaining unit contending that James Hanley (Hanley) is managerial pursuant to 
§201.7 of the Act because he formulates policy and has a major role in the 
administration of the parties' agreement and/or personnel administration. UCE supports 
the ALJ's decision to place the Deputy Director position into the bargaining unit. 
In its cross-exceptions, UCE contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that Eric. 
Hertz (Hertz), the Executive Studies Program Director, and Joseph Arcoleo (Arcoleo), 
the Health and Safety Director are managerial, pursuant to §201.7 of the Act. FIT 
141 PERB 114004(2008). 
2
 Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that such 
term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than sections 
two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, . . . persons who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board. . . . Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and 
act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
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supports the ALJ's exclusion of the Executive Studies Program Director and the Health 
and Safety Director from the bargaining unit. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act, a managerial employee is a person who 
formulates policy on behalf of an employer, is required to directly assist in the 
preparation and formulation of an employer's collective bargaining proposals, plays a 
major role in the administration of an agreement or plays a major role in personnel 
administration. 
Since the 1971 amendment to §201.7(a) of the Act to exclude managerial and 
confidential employees from coverage under the Act, the Board has held that the 
statutory criteria for such designations should be applied strictly, in order to preserve 
existing negotiating units, with all uncertainties resolved in favor of coverage under the 
Act.3 This approach stems directly from the text and legislative history of the 1971 
amendment. 
Our careful scrutiny in making managerial designations is also based upon our 
recognition that, unlike the National Labor Relations Act,4 the Act does not exclude 
supervisors from coverage nor does it define what constitutes a supervisor.5 As a 
3
 See, State of New York, 5 PERB TJ3001 (1972); CityofBinghamton, 10 PERB fl3038 
(1977); City of Jamestown, 19 PERB 1J3019 (1986); Owego-Apalachin CentSch Dist, 
33 PERB H3005 (2000); County of Ostego 34 PERB 1J3024 (2001). 
4
 29 USC §§152(3) and (11). 
5
 St. Paul Boulevard Fire Dist, 42 PERB P009 (2009). 
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result, we draw a distinction between employees who perform various supervisory 
duties and responsibilities, who are covered by the Act, and the much narrower subset 
of employees with broad powers to develop "particular objectives of a government or 
agency thereof in the fulfillment of its mission and the method, means and extent of 
achieving such objectives."6 
We draw a similar distinction between supervisory and managerial employees 
under the Act with respect to duties related to the administration of an agreement and 
personnel administration. It is common for supervisors to be involved in the processing 
of grievances, but a managerial designation will be made, pursuant to §207.1 (a)(ii) of 
the Act, only when it is demonstrated that the supervisor plays a "major role" in 
implementing the agreement, including the authority to change the employer's 
procedures or methods of operation, or engages in a similarly significant role in 
personnel administration.7 
The clearest articulation of the applicable standard for determining whether an 
employee formulates policy, pursuant to §207.1 (a)(i) of the Act, was set forth in City of 
Binghamton: 
To formulate policy is to participate with regularity in the 
6
 State of New York, supra note 3, 5 PERB 1J3001 at 3005; Bd ofEduc, Copiague Public 
Schools, UFSD, No. 5, 6 PERB ^3001(1973), confirmed sub nom. Bd ofEduc ofSch 
DistNo. 1 vHelsby, 42 AD2d 1056, 6 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dept 1973), affd, 35 NY2d 877 
(1974), State of New York-Unified Court System, 30 PERB 1J3067 (1997), confirmed sub 
nom. Lippman v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 263 AD2d 891, 32 PERB ^7017 (3d 
Dept 1999). 
7
 State of New York, supra note 3; Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth, 7 PERB H3025 
(1974), confirmed sub nom. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth v New York State Pub 
EmpI Rel Bd, 48 AD2d 206, 8 PERB 1J7009 (3d Dept 1975), Iv denied, 37 NY2d 712 
(1975); Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 15 PERB ^3031 (1982). 
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essential process involving the determination of the goals 
and objectives of the government involved, and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives that 
have a substantial impact upon the affairs and the 
constituency of the government. The formulation of policy 
does not extend to the determination of methods of 
operation that are merely of a technical nature.8 
We applied this well-established standard In Fashion Institute of Technology,9 
when we designated the acting Director of Health Services as managerial because she 
formulated and implemented campus-wide policies and procedures related to FIT'S 
mission by providing health support services to students. 
We note, however, in Dormitory Authority of the State of New York10 (Dormitory 
Authority), the Board announced a "different template with which to evaluate the 
managerial status of a title"11 premised on an employer's adoption of a less hierarchical 
structure which grants greater employee participation in decision-making. While we 
agree that organizational structure is relevant to determining whether a person is 
managerial pursuant §201.7(a)(i) of the Act, we overrule Dormitory Authority to the 
extent it adopted a new standard rendering hierarchical compression or an employer's 
adoption of other alternative forms of work organization as a determinative or primary 
factor. An organizational structure or culture that encourages employee input into the 
creation and modification of employer policies or the means of operation does not 
8
 Supra note 3, 10 PERB 1J3038 at 3185. 
9
 40 PERB 1(3018 (2007), confirmed sub nom. United College Employees of the Fashion 
Institute of Technology, Local 3457, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Be/, 41 PERB |[7003 (Sup Ct New York County 2008). 
10
 38 PERB 1J3029 (2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bd, 34 AD3d 884, 39 PERB fl7011 (3d Dept 2006). 
11
 38 PERB P029 at 3097. 
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necessarily metamorphosize an employee into a person that should be designated 
managerial under §201.7(a) of the Act. Granting managerial designations primarily 
based upon such a structure or culture would be at variance with City of Binghamtorf2 
and has the potential to disrupt existing negotiation units through organizational 
reassessments and restructuring, a result we find inconsistent with the Legislature's 
intent in enacting the 1971 amendment to §201.7(a). 
DISCUSSION 
The exceptions and cross-exceptions require the Board to determine whether 
Hanley formulates FIT policy, has a major role in the administration of the parties' 
agreement or a major role in personnel administration, pursuant to §§201.7(a)(i) and (ii) 
of the Act and whether Hertz and Arcoleo formulate FIT policy pursuant to §201.7(a)(i) 
of the Act. 
FIT is a specialized college within the State University of New York (SUNY) with 
the Board of Education of the City of New York as its local sponsor. FIT offers courses 
leading to associate, baccalaureate and graduate degrees. In addition, it offers 
professional studies programs in art, design, business and technology. 
FIT is administered by a Board of Trustees (Board), which has the authority to 
appoint the FIT President (President), to formulate policy in conjunction with the 
President and her cabinet, to adopt curricula subject to approval by the SUNY Board of 
Trustees, to adopt an annual budget, to approve increases in student tuition and fees, 
and to accept gifts and property suitable for carrying out FIT's programs and purposes. 
) 
12
 Supra note 3. 
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The President is the chief executive officer with daily responsibilities that include 
appointing employees, except those officers selected by the Board. The President's 
cabinet is composed of seven Vice-Presidents, the Director of the Museum at FIT 
(Museum) and six Deans, who are unrepresented employees. 
FIT has six schools of instruction, each supervised by a Dean: School of Art and 
Design; School of Business and Technology; School of Continuing and Professional 
Studies; Curriculum and Instruction; School of Graduate Studies; and the School of 
Liberal Arts. Each school is subdivided into departments, programs, centers or 
institutes. Within an FIT school that confers degrees, a subdivision is headed by a 
Department Chair or an Associate Department Chair. In contrast, a subdivision in a 
non-degree conferring FIT school is headed by a Director, Manager or Coordinator. 
Among the non-degree conferring schools is the School of Continuing and 
Professional Studies which is comprised of four centers and programs: the Enterprise 
Center; the Executive Studies Program,13 the Center for Pre-College Programs and the 
Center for Professional Studies. 
Joan Volpe (Volpe) is the Coordinator for the Center of Professional Studies. 
She is responsible for designing, managing and marketing non-degree seminar and 
training programs. She reports to the Dean of Continuing Education and Professional 
Studies and the Vice President for Academic Affairs. 
The Educational Foundation for the Fashion Industries (Educational Foundation) 
is a not-for-profit foundation which performs advisory and fundraising activities on behalf 
13
 The Executive Studies Program was subsequently moved of FIT's School of 
Graduate Studies. Transcript, p. 571. 
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of FIT. The Educational Foundation has its own Board and it receives gifts and 
donations on behalf of FIT and maintains an endowment for the FIT Museum. 
UCE represents a unit composed of non-instructional, instructional and 
supervisory personnel, including Museum Curators, Faculty, Department Chairs, 
Program Managers, Directors and Coordinators in FIT's six schools of instruction. 
A. Deputy Director James Hanley 
Following our review of the record in the present case, we deny FIT's contention 
that Hanley's duties as Deputy Director demonstrate that he is managerial pursuant to 
§207.1 (a) of the Act. We concur with the ALJ's finding that Valerie Steele (Steele), who 
is the Director and Chief Curator of the Museum and a member ofthe President's 
cabinet, is the only staff member who formulates FIT's Museum policies. 
In 2003, Hanley was hired to the newly created Assistant Director position to 
assist Steele in the administration ofthe Museum's operations. His administrative 
responsibilities include budgetary and financial matters, fundraising, and the supervision 
of staff. He assists in the preparation ofthe Museum's proposed budget which Steele 
presents to FIT's President. Following Board approval of the budget, Hanley is 
responsible for monitoring the use ofthe funds allocated to each Museum department. 
Steele is responsible for determining whether to abolish or significantly modify a 
Museum department or its funding. 
Steele has ultimate authority over all purchases; however, Hanley supervises 
and approves purchase orders and requisitions under Steele's supervision. Hanley 
communicates directly with the Educational Foundation with respect to Foundation 
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expenditures for the Museum and advises Steele about the amount of available 
Foundation funds. 
Hanley has fundraising responsibilities, but he does not act independently of 
Steele. For example, they helped establish the Couture Council, a group of individuals 
willing to make contributions in exchange for certain Museum services and benefits. 
A Museum committee composed of Steele, Hanley and Museum Curators review 
and determine which objects should be purchased for the Museum's collection. In 
preparation for a Paris auction, Steele, Hanley and the Curators studied the auction 
catalog and determined which objects Hanley should attempt to purchase at the 
auction. Steele and Hanley then calculated the amount that Hanley would bid for each 
of those objects during the auction. 
Hanley took the necessary administrative steps to obtain an accreditation of the 
Museum from the American Association of Museums (AAM) including applying for a 
federal grant for a museum assessment study, supervising the preparation of the 
necessary reports, corresponding with AAM; assisting Steele in selecting an appropriate 
surveyor and drafting a Board resolution, which was subsequently adopted, declaring 
the Museum to be a permanent part of FIT'S operations. 
At the time Hanley was hired, a draft deaccession policy for the Museum had 
been presented to the President for her approval. The deaccession policy sets the 
criteria and procedure for the sale or transfer of objects from the Museum's collection. 
After becoming Deputy Director, Hanley proposed a new policy requiring the Museum to 
notify the original donor of the Museum's intent to sell an object and to credit the original 
donor from the proceeds of the sale. 
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Hanley is a member of the Museum's exhibition planning committee, along with 
Steele and other staff. The committee determines when portions of the Museum's 
collection will be exhibited at other institutions. Although Hanley may negotiate and 
draft the contracts for such exhibitions, Steele retains ultimate approval authority over 
the contracts. Hanley, however, does have primary administrative responsibility over 
making arrangements for the delivery of objects from the Museum's collection to an 
exhibition and making the necessary travel arrangements for staff. 
Hanley has supervisory responsibilities with respect to Museum staff including 
counseling staff, approving timesheets and overtime requests. He makes 
recommendations to Steele about hiring, leaves of absence, promotions and 
terminations. Staff evaluations are prepared by Museum Department Heads which are 
reviewed by Steele and Hanley. Hanley prepares evaluations for non-tenured Museum 
Department Heads and Curators. With respect to tenure, Hanley is responsible for 
making recommendations which are forwarded to the President and Board for review 
and approval. Finally, Hanley has had involvement with a single employee grievance 
which was handled by a Human Resources representative. 
While it is clear that Hanley performs many supervisory and administrative duties 
on behalf of the Museum, and contributes ideas with respect to the Museum's budget, 
programs and fundraising, he does not have substantial and unfettered discretion in 
making daily decisions with respect to Museum programs and operations. Contrary to 
FITs arguments, the scope and nature of Hanley's duties are not analogous to the 
Case No. CP-939 -11-
duties described in earlier Board decisions where we designated employees because 
they formulate policy under §201.7(a)(i) of the Act.14 
Finally, we do not find that Hanley's supervisory duties with respect to 
subordinate staff and his minor participation in a single grievance demonstrate that he 
plays a major role in employee relations warranting a designation pursuant to 
§201.7(a)(ii)oftheAct. 
B. Executive Studies Program Director Eric Hertz 
Next, we turn to UCE's cross-exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that 
Executive Studies Program Director Hertz formulates policy pursuant to §201.7(a)(i) of 
the Act. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ erred in finding 
that Hertz formulates policy. 
In 2004, FIT hired Hertz to be the Director of the newly established Executive 
Studies Program Director. The creation of the program had its genesis in a 
recommendation made by Voipe, the Coordinator of the Center of Professional Studies. 
At the beginning of his tenure, Hertz examined executive education programs 
offered at other colleges and interviewed members of senior fashion industry 
management to obtain their feedback about possible FIT program models. Following 
his research, he presented a plan to the President, Vice President of Academic Affairs 
Cortes (Cortes) and the Dean of the School of Continuing Education and Professional 
Studies Kornberg (Kornberg) which was approved. 
14
 See, e.g.Jown ofBrookhaven, 27 PERB Tf3043 (1994); State of New York, 36 PERB 
1J3029 (2003); Dormitory Auth of the State of New York, supra note 10. 
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Since that time, Hertz's primary responsibilities have been primarily the 
administration and marketing of a non-degree executive study program under the 
supervision of the President, Vice President Cortes and Dean Komberg. His 
recommendations with respect to the program budget, tuition, and teacher 
compensation are all subject to his supervisors' review and approval. The program 
offers a certificate course, known as the Advanced Management Program (AMP), aimed 
at second tier fashion management with 10-15 years of experience. Hertz designed 
and structured AMP as a four module course, selected the instructors, determined 
which instructors would be invited to return, administered the registration and reviewed 
participant evaluations. 
Hertz's duties, however, are limited to only one program offered within the 
multitude of subdivisions within FIT'S six schools of instruction.15 Department Chairs, 
Associate Department Chairs and Coordinators, who are in the UCE bargaining unit, 
perform similar duties to Hertz in the creation and marketing of courses and programs 
within their respective subdivisions. In addition, they are at the same level in the FIT 
hierarchy and are subject to the same supervisory structure. While such comparative 
facts are not determinative of Hertz's managerial status under §201.7(a)(i) of the Act, 
they are relevant in our determination that Hertz's duties do not rise to the level of 
determining FIT's mission and objectives or establishing the means for accomplishing 
those objectives. 
15
 Compare, East Meadow Union Free Sen Dist, 16 PERB1J3027 (1983) (School district 
employee designated managerial based upon her district-wide responsibility for 
directing the music and art program and establishing the curriculum). 
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C. Health and Safety Director Joseph Arcoleo 
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the managerial status of Arcoleo 
under §201.7(a)(i) of the Act and, therefore, deny UCE's cross-exceptions with respect 
to him. 
In 2003, FIT created the Health and Safety Director position, a position 
responsible for the development and implementation of a campus-wide environmental 
health and safety program. The position is directly subordinate to the FIT General 
Counsel in the college's organizational chart.16 
The evidence in the record firmly establishes that Arcoleo creates, implements 
and enforces campus-wide policies and procedures with respect to environmental, 
health and safety compliance. At the time of his appointment, FIT lacked written 
policies with respect to environmental, health, and safety issues. 
Arcoleo's exclusive responsibilities include preparing and enforcing FIT 
environmental, health and safety policies. In addition, he is responsible for educating 
staff and students, as well as outside contractors, about the substance of the policies. 
He ensures FIT's compliance with federal, state, and municipal environmental, health 
and safety laws, rules and regulations and has wide discretion for determining when 
FIT's policies should contain stricter standards than those required by law. 
Following his appointment, Arcoleo conducted an assessment of existing FIT 
practices and procedures to determine where the college needed to establish and 
implement policies. As part of his assessment, he visited classrooms and laboratories 
16
 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. 
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in various FIT departments where he interviewed staff and students. Following his 
assessment, Arcoleo prepared a detailed schedule for the development and 
implementation of campus-wide policies and procedures. Consistent with that schedule, 
Arcoleo prepares policies and procedures. 
In 2004, Arcoleo prepared a proposed respiratory protection program policy 
which includes more stringent standards than those mandated by law to protect against 
airborne hazards. The respiratory policy requires the use of localized exhaust 
ventilation as the primary means for protecting students and staff against hazardous 
vapors, fumes and dust instead of utilizing respirators. During his visits to classrooms 
and laboratories, Arcoleo informs staff and students about the general policy against the 
use of respirators, the circumstances when respirators are appropriate and the policy's 
regulations concerning the proper use and maintenance of respirators. When he 
discovers a practice at variance with the policy, Arcoleo notifies the appropriate 
department head about their department's noncompliance. 
He also proposed a policy and outline for FIT contractors in preparing work 
specific environmental, health and safety plans. Although FIT has not formally adopted 
his recommendation for it to be a standard FIT contract provision, Arcoleo has been 
permitted to enforce the policy with outside contractors. 
Arcoleo also created a policy regulating welding and burning and other "hot work" 
aimed at complying with all federal, state, and local regulations. The policy mandates 
safety precautions and requires the submission of a permit to Arcoleo's office describing 
the work. The permit form has been distributed to FIT departments and various 
departments have complied with the permit requirement. 
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Finally, Arcoleo prepared the written criteria for the selection of a hazardous 
materials contractor to dispose of FIT's hazardous waste, which was incorporated into 
FIT's request for proposals. Pending selection of a contractor, Arcoleo ordered a 
temporary moratorium on FIT's hazardous waste disposal. He also prepared the final 
draft of an FIT hazard communication program along with an emergency response 
procedure for hazardous chemical and hazardous waste incidents. 
Based upon Arcoleo's broad authority to formulate and implement campus-wide 
policies and procedures, under the direct supervision of FIT's General Counsel, we 
conclude that he is managerial pursuant to §201.7(a)(i) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the unit placement petition is granted to the 
extent of placing the Deputy Director of the Museum at FIT and Executive Studies 
Program Director into the negotiating unit represented by UCE and the unit placement 
petition is dismissed as to the Director of Environmental Health and Safety Compliance. 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
^ W M ^ 
Jerome Lefkowjfz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ o u « ; u o r*~i4. Sheila S. Core, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Wallkill (Town) 
and exceptions filed by the Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent Association, inc. (PBA)to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge, which 
alleges that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it implemented Local Law No. 2 of 2007 (Local Law) which 
established police disciplinary procedures in conflict with the negotiated disciplinary 
procedures contained in the parties' expired collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement). 
At a hearing before the ALJ, following the stipulated admission of exhibits, both 
parties rested after making opening statements and without calling any witnesses. 
Following the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of additional exhibits. 
After both parties submitted briefs arguing their respective legal positions, the ALJ 
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issued a decision concluding that the Town violated §§209-a.1 (d) and (e) by 
implementing the Local Law and dismissing the PBA's claim that the Town repudiated 
the agreement, in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (d), by refusing to comply with the 
agreement's negotiated disciplinary procedure.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Town asserts that the ALJ exceeded her authority when she 
rejected the Town's legal arguments that police disciplinary procedures are a prohibited 
subject based upon the provisions of Town Law §§154 and 155 and the holdings in 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board 2 (hereinafter NYCPBA) and other court decisions. In 
addition, the Town contends that the ALJ erred in: a) her conclusion that the police 
disciplinary procedure in the Town is not a prohibited subject of negotiations; b) her 
interpretation of NYCPBA and Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, AFSCME v Helsby3 
(hereinafter Auburn); c) her application of the Board's analysis in Tarrytown Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association, Inc4 (hereinafter Tarrytown) and her reliance on the holding in 
Eliasv Town of Crawford5 (hereinafter Crawford); and d) her order that the Town return to 
the negotiated disciplinary procedures in the agreement. 
The PBA supports the ALJ's decision finding that the Town violated §§209-a.1(d) 
141 PERB 1J4562 (2008). 
2
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB H7006 (2006). 
310 PERB 1J3045 (1977), vacated, 91 Misc2d 909, 10 PERB ^7016 (Sup Ct Albany 
County, 1977), affd, 62 AD2d 12, 11 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 1978), affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 
12 PERB 1J7006 (1979). 
4
 40 PERB H3024 (2007). 
5
 17 Misc3d 176, 41 PERB 1J7505 (Sup Ct Orange County 2007). 
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and (e) by implementing the new disciplinary procedure but excepts to the ALJ's dismissal 
of its claim that the Town's conduct constituted a repudiation of the agreement in violation 
of §§209-a.1(a) and (d). The Town supports the ALJ's decision dismissing the PBA's 
repudiation claim. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as necessary to address the exceptions. The PBA has been the exclusive negotiation 
representative for the unit of Town police officers since 1998.6 The parties' last 
agreement expired on December 31,2003. 
Article 29 of the parties' expired agreement sets forth the negotiated procedures 
for the discipline of Town police officers. 
Section 29.1 of the agreement states, in part: 
This procedure and its terms shall be the sole and exclusive 
procedure and remedy for employee disciplinary matters 
other than termination and shall constitute a waiver of rights 
bargaining unit members have or may have under Civil 
Service Law Section 75 and Town Law section 155. 
Under the negotiated disciplinary procedure, the Police Chief (Chief) has the 
authority to issue a notice of discipline setting forth allegations of misconduct or 
incompetence along with a proposed penalty. Following issuance of a notice of 
discipline, the Chief must conduct a disciplinary interview with the officer and, thereafter, 
issue a written decision. If the Chief finds the officer guilty, the officer may appeal the 
) 
6
 31 PERB 113000.12 (1998). 
Case No. U-27426 - 4 -
notice of discipline and penalty to the Town Supervisor, who is required to conduct a 
private informal meeting with the officer, and thereafter issue a written decision. The 
PBA can serve and file a demand for arbitration within 14 days of receipt of the Town 
Supervisor's decision. The selected arbitrator's opinion and award is final and binding 
on the-parties. 
Prior to implementation of the Local Law, the Town and the PBA were parties to 
a number of arbitrations pursuant to Article 29 of the agreement. 
On January 25, 2007, the Town Board (Board) enacted the Local Law which 
adopted a new Town police disciplinary procedure and directed the Chief to take all 
necessary steps to implement the new procedure. The stated intent of the legislation 
was to establish a new Town police disciplinary procedure pursuant to Town Law §§154 
and 155 and in accordance with the Town's interpretation of NYCPBA.7 
Under the disciplinary procedures established by the Local Law, the Chief, 
Deputy Chief or the Chiefs designee can issue a notice of discipline and conduct a 
disciplinary interview of the police officer. Following the disciplinary interview, the Chief 
issues a written decision which is referred to the Board for a determination of the 
charges. Within 14 days after receipt of the Chief's decision, the police officer can 
request a hearing and the Board has the option to designate a Board member to hear 
the case or to select a hearing officer. Following a hearing, the Board member or 
hearing officer is responsible for submitting recommended findings of fact and a 
proposed disciplinary penalty to the Board for its final determination. The Board's final 
determination is subject to challenge pursuant to CPLR Article 78 within 30 days from 
the date of the Board's determination. 
7
 The Local Law does not reference Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76. 
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On February 5, 2007, a PBA representative wrote to the Town Supervisor stating 
the PBA's position that the Town is obligated to follow the negotiated disciplinary 
procedure contained in the expired agreement. Although the Town did not respond to 
the PBA's letter in writing before the filing of the charge on June 13, 2007, the Town's 
counsel confirmed that the Town will be implementing the Local Law.8 
DISCUSSION 
A. Authority of the ALJ to Rule on the Legal Question of Prohibition 
Contrary to the Town's exceptions, the ALJ did not exceed her authority by 
rejecting the Town's argument, premised on Town Law §§154 and 155, NYCPBA and 
other case law, that the Town's police disciplinary procedure is a prohibited subject of 
negotiations. 
During the course of processing improper practice charges, representation 
petitions and declaratory rulings, the agency is frequently presented with questions of 
statutory interpretation with respect to the Act, as well as external law. While the courts 
will grant varying degrees of deference to our statutory interpretation depending on 
whether it involves an application of the Act, such as defining a statutory term of art, or 
the resolution of a question of pure statutory construction aimed at discerning legislative 
intent,9 the mere fact that an ALJ rejects a legal argument presented by one party or 
8
 In Town ofWallkill, 42 PERB1J3006 (2009), we recently dismissed a related improper 
practice charge alleging that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act when it 
failed to explicitly respond to three PBA information requests concerning the Town's 
intentions with respect to complying with the negotiated disciplinary procedure. 
9
 See, Matter of Suffolk Regional OTB v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd, 11 
NY3d 559 (2008); Matter of Rosen v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 72 NY2d 42, 21 
PERB 1J7014 (1988); Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters' Assn v New York State 
Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 6 NY3d 514, 39 PERB 117005 (2006); NYCTA v New York State Pub 
EmpI Rel Bd, 8 NY3d 226, 40 PERB 1J7001 (2007). 
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another does not render the ALJ's decision ultra vires. 
Therefore, we deny the Town's exception asserting that the ALJ lacks authority 
to determine the primary legal question presented by the parties, whether a police 
disciplinary procedure is a prohibited subject.10 
We next turn to the Town's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the 
Town violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act by implementing the Local Law police 
disciplinary procedures. 
B. Police Disciplinary Procedures in the Town of Wallkill 
Following careful consideration of the Town's exceptions, we conclude that the 
Town's unilateral change with respect to the police disciplinary procedures is not a 
prohibited subject. 
B. (1) Applicable Precedent with Respect to Negotiability of Town Police Discipline 
As we discussed in City ofAlbanyu (hereinafter Albany) for over three decades, 
the Board and the courts have generally held that police disciplinary procedures 
constitute a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act.12 
We also deny the Town's exception asserting that the ALJ erred in describing its 
counsel's letter as stating that the Town had implemented the Local Law. The Local 
Law itself contains a directive to the Chief to take all necessary actions to implement the 
new procedures. Furthermore, during the hearing, the Town's counsel acknowledged 
that the Town was treating the Local Law as superseding the negotiated disciplinary 
procedures. Transcript, p. 24. 
11
 42 PERB 1J3005 (2009). 
12
 See, City of Albany, 7 PERB 1J3078 (1974), 7 PERB P079 (1974), confirmed sub 
nom. City of Albany vHelsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dept 1975), affd, 38 
NY2d 778, 9 PERB 1J7005 (1975); City of Albany, 9 PERB P009 (1976), confirmed sub 
nom. City of Albany v Helsby, 56 AD2d 976, 10 PERB U7006 (3d Dept 1977). See also, 
Binghamton Civil Service Forum v City of Binghamton, 44 NY2d 23, 11 PERB 1J7508 
(1978). 
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In Auburn,™ the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Appellate Division 
holding that a proposal to negotiate a contractual alternative to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 
76 for police discipline was not a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
In reliance on Auburn, the Board in Amherst Police Club, lnc.u held that a 
negotiation demand seeking a contractual disciplinary procedure for town police to 
replace the statutory disciplinary procedures set forth in Town Law §155, Unconsol Law 
§5775, and Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations 
under the Act. In addition, in Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent Association,™ an ALJ's 
decision, finding that the PBA's negotiation demand for representation during a police 
disciplinary interrogation constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations, became final 
following the failure of the Town to file exceptions.16 
In NYCPBA, the Court reaffirmed the holding in Auburn that a proposal to 
negotiate a grievance/arbitration provision for police discipline to replace Civ Serv Law 
§§75 and 76 procedures was a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act. The 
Court distinguished Auburn, however, and held that special police disciplinary 
procedures in that case, the New York City Charter and Administrative Code and the 
Rockland County Police Act (hereinafter RCPA), which pre-date Civ Serv Law §§75 and 
76, demonstrate a public policy that outweighed the strong and sweeping policy 
supporting collective negotiations under the Act. In addition, the Court cited with favor 
13
 Supra note 3. 
1412PERBfl3071 (1979). 
15
 24 PERB 114566(1991). 
16
 PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) §213.6. 
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prior Appellate Division decisions that had held that particular special state laws 
delegating police discipline to local officials rendered police disciplinary procedures a 
prohibited subject in those specific towns and municipalities.17 
In construing NYCPBA, we note that the Court affirmed the Appellate Division, 
Second Department's decision in Town of Orangetown v Orangetown Police Benevolent 
Association,™ which held that RCPA, as a special law, preempts the negotiability of 
police discipline in a town subject to that special law. In addition, the Court cited with 
favor an earlier decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department,19 which relied 
upon another special law, WCPA, rather than Town Law §155, to conclude that the 
subject of police discipline in a town covered by WCPA is prohibited. More recently, in 
Crawford,20 a Supreme Court justice held that Town Law §155, as a general law, does 
not render police discipline a prohibited subject under NYCPBA. 
17
 See, Matter of Town of Greenburgh, 94 AD2d 771, 16 PERB1J7510 (2d Dept 1983), 
Iv denied, 60 NY2d 551 (1983); (Westchester County Police Act [hereinafter WCPA], L 
1936, c 104, as amended by L 1941, c 812, is a special law); City of New York v 
MacDonald, 201 AD2ti 258, 27 PERB 1J7503 (1st Dept 1994) Iv dented, 83 NY2d 759 
(1994) (city charter and administrative code provisions originally enacted by the 
Legislature); City of Mount Vernon v Cuevas, 289 AD2d 674, 34 PERB 1J7038 (3d Dept 
2001) Iv denied, 97 NY2d 613, 35 PERB fl7005 (2002) (city charter enacted by the 
Legislature, L 1922, c 490). See also, Rockland County PBA v Town of Clarkstown, 
149 AD2d 516, 22 PERB 1J7516 (2d Dept 1989), Stony Point PBA v Shankey, 125 AD2d 
314 (2d Dept 1986) Steinman v Village of Spring Valley, 261 AD2d 548 (2d Dept 1999) 
(RCPA is a special law); Gizzo v Town of Mamaroneck, 36 AD3d 162, 39 PERB H7527 
(2006) Iv denied, 8 NY3d 806 (2007) (WCPA is a special law). 
1818 AD3d 879, 38 PERB 1J7507 (2d Dept 2005). See also, Rockland County PBA v 
Town of Clarkstown, supra note 17. 
19
 Matter of Town of Greenburgh, supra note 17. 
Supra note 5. 
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B(2) The Town Violated §5209-a.1(d) and (e) by Unilaterally Abandoning the 
Disciplinary Procedures Negotiated to Replace Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 
In the present case, both the Town and the PBA recognized the applicability of 
Civ Serv Law §75 to certain members of the bargaining unit when they negotiated, in 
Article 29 of the agreement, an express waiver of that statutory procedure in exchange 
for the negotiated grievance arbitration procedure. 
In Owen v Town Board of Town of Wallkill (hereinafter Owen),2^ the Appellate 
Division, Second Department held that a Town police officer, who was an honorably 
discharged veteran during a time of war, was entitled to Civ Serv Law §75 disciplinary 
procedures and not Town Law §155 procedures. The Appellate Division's holding in 
Owen was premised on a provision in Civ Serv Law 75.1(b), originally enacted in the 
Civil Service Law of 1909,22 granting an honorably discharged veteran certain 
procedural protections against discipline.23 Subsequently, the Legislature expanded the 
coverage of the statutory disciplinary procedure, in the former Civ Serv Law §22, to 
certain public employees who are volunteer firefighters.24 These Civil Service Law 
procedural protections for honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters pre-
date the enactment of Town Law §155. 
21
 94 AD2d 768 (2d Dept 1983) Iv denied, 60 NY2d 560 (1983). See also, Town Bd of 
Town of Wallkill v Owen, 127 AD2d 589 (2d Dept 1987); 1991 NY Op Atty Gen (Inf) 
1067(1991), 1991 WL 537220. 
22
 L 1909, c 15, and codified as Civ Serv Law §22. 
23
 See, Rizzo v Town of Hempstead, 1 AD2d 906 (2d Dept 1956); O'Brien v Hughes, 
270 AD 1072 (4th Dept 1946). 
24
 See, L 1930, c 214; Brown v Stephan, 245 AD 588 (4th Dept 1935); Wamsley v East 
Ramapo Cent Sch Dist Bd of Educ, 281 AD2d 633 (2d Dept 2001). 
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In Werner v Town of Niskayuna (hereinafter Niskayuna), a lower court held that 
NYCPBA is inapplicable to that Town's police officers because they are subject to Civ 
Serv Law §§75 and 76 procedures.26 
Despite the holding in Owen, as well as the terms of the agreement, the Town 
has not advanced any argument to support its unilateral action to abandon the 
negotiated grievance arbitration process to replace Civ Serv Law §75 procedures 
through the enactment of the Local Law. 
Based upon the holding in Auburn, as reaffirmed in NYCPBA, along with the 
applicability of Civ Serv Law §75 procedures to at least some employees in the PBA 
unit, i.e., honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters, we conclude that the 
negotiated police disciplinary procedure in the agreement to replace Civ Serv Law §75 
is not prohibited. Therefore, the Town violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act when it 
implemented the Local Law, and thereby unilaterally nullified the parties' negotiated 
procedures to replace Civ Serv Law §75. 
B(3) The Town Violated 5$209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act by Unilaterally 
Abandoning the Disciplinary Procedures Negotiated to Replace Town 
LawS 155 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the Town's exceptions which 
assert that negotiations over police disciplinary procedures are preempted by Town Law 
§§154 and 155. 
The Town challenges the ALJ's legal conclusion that Town Law §§154 and 155, 
25
 41 PERB1J7518 (Sup Ct Schenectady County 2008) nor. 
26
 More recently, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in Farabell v Town of 
Macedon, 62 AD3d 1246 (4th Dept 2009) sustained the termination of a Town police 
officer under Civ Serv Law §75 while, at the same time, recognizing the applicability of 
the police disqualification provisions contained in Town Law §151. 
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as general laws, do not render police discipline a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
The Town's challenge is premised on its interpretation of NYCPBA, certain dicta 
contained in the Court of Appeals' decision in Police Benevolent Assn of New York 
State Troopers, Inc. v Division of State Police (hereinafter NYS Troopers PBA)27 along 
with the Town's criticism of the Board's decision in Tarrytown28 and a lower court's 
decision in Crawford29 which conflict with the Town's arguments. 
In City of New York,30 the Board emphasized the narrowness of the holding in 
NYCPBA. Subsequently, in Tarrytown, we concluded that "only special state legislation, 
enacted prior to CSL §§75 and 76, granting specific local officials the power and 
authority over police discipline, can preempt police discipline negotiations under 
NYCPBA.'™ Therefore, we held in Tarrytown that a special law applicable to 
Westchester County village police departments, but not Village Law §8-804, a general 
law, preempted the negotiability of police discipline in the Village of Tarrytown.32 More 
recently, \n Albany, a Board majority reaffirmed Tarrytown by stating that "NYCPBA 
holds that a special State law, enacted prior to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76(4), granting 
specific local officials the power and authority over police discipline, preempts the 
11 NY3d 96, 41 PERB U7511 (2008). 
Supra note 4. 
Supra note 6. 
40 PERB 1|3017 at 3072, note 53 (2007). 
40PERB1J3017at3102. 
40 PERB P017 at 3105, note 27. 
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negotiability of police discipline under the Act in that municipality."33 
No court has held that Town Law §§154 and 155, in conjunction with NYCPBA 
and other decisions, render town police disciplinary procedures a prohibited subject. In 
contrast, two lower courts have ruled that police disciplinary procedure is not a 
prohibited subject to town police in local jurisdictions which are not subject to a special 
state police discipline statute.34 
The interpretation of NYCPBA in Tarrytown, Albany and Crawford is supported 
by the Appellate Division, Second Department's decision in Town ofWallkill v Town of 
Wallkill Police Benevolent Association,35 where it rejected the Town's argument,36 
premised on NYCPBA, that an arbitration award finding that the Town violated the 
disciplinary procedures in Article 29 of the agreement should be vacated on public 
policy grounds because the award usurped the Chiefs disciplinary authority. 
Furthermore, our interpretation is consistent with the approach followed by the Appellate 
Division, First Department in City of New York v Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of 
the City of New York37 (NYCPBA II), which distinguished NYCPBA based upon the 
specific investigatory authority delegated to the Police Commissioner by the New York 
City Administrative Code. 
33
 Supra note 1.1, 42 PERB1J3005 at 3009. 
34
 Bias v Town of Crawford, supra note 5; Werner v Town of Niskayuna, supra note 25. 
35
 56 AD3d 482, 42 PERB fl7506 (2d Dept 2008), Iv denied, 12 NY3d 709, 42 PERB 
1J7507 (2009). 
36
 Supra note 41, Reply Brief of the Petitioner-Appellant Town ofWallkill, Point II, 2007 
WL 5879759. 
37
 56 AD3d 70, 41 PERB 1T7514 (1st Dept 2008), Iv granted, 12 NY3d 707 (2009). 
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In Tarrytown and Albany, we referenced the text and legislative history of the Act, 
together with Board and judicial precedent, to support the conclusion that New York 
public policy, as established by the Legislature, favors the negotiability of police 
disciplinary procedures except in local jurisdictions subject to special State police 
discipline statutes that pre-date Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76.38 
As noted in Albany, despite over three decades of Board and court decisions 
concluding that, in general, police disciplinary procedures constitute a mandatory 
subject, the Legislature has not amended §§201, 204 and 209(4) of the Act to exclude 
police disciplinary procedures from the subjects that constitute terms and conditions of 
employment and are mandatorily negotiable for police officers of counties, cities, towns, 
villages and police districts. 
In contrast, the Legislature has enacted amendments to §§209(2) and (4) of the 
Act which demonstrate a clear public policy decision that the subject of disciplinary 
procedures for police officers is, in general, negotiable but excluded from the subjects 
that can be finally resolved in a compulsory interest arbitration for specifically defined 
negotiations units.39 
The text and legislative history surrounding compulsory interest arbitration for 
38
 Our conclusions in Tarrytown and Albany were premised on NYCPBA, where the 
Court reaffirmed Auburn, but found that certain prior special laws can render police 
discipline a prohibited subject. At the same time, we recognize that the provisions of a 
general law, with respect to other subjects, can embody a strong public policy rendering 
a particular subject prohibited. See, Mamaroneck PBA, Inc. vNew York State Pub EmpI 
RelBd, 66 NY2d 722, 18 PERB1J7015 (1985); Matter of Board of Educ v New York 
State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 1J7012 (1990). 
39
 See, L 1995, c 432; L 1995, c 447; L 2001, c 586; L 2002, c 220; L 2002, c 232; L 
2003, c 641; L 2003, c 696; L 2004, c 63; L 2005, c 737; L 2007, c 190; L 2008, c 179; L 
2008, c 234; §§209.4(e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the Act. See also, County of Suffolk and 
Suffolk County Sheriff, 40 PERB P022 (2007). 
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members of the State Police provide the most explicit articulation of legislative intent 
with respect to the negotiability of police disciplinary procedures. When the Legislature 
extended compulsory interest arbitration to members of the State Police in 1995, it 
expressly provided in §209(4) of the Act that disciplinary procedures for the State Police 
cannot be submitted for resolution at compulsory interest arbitration as it is for other 
police bargaining units.40 The 1995 amendment added a new subsection (e) to §209(4) 
of the Act which states: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of troopers, 
commissioned or non-commissioned officers of the division 
of state police, the provisions of this section shall only apply 
to the terms of collective bargaining agreements directly 
relating to compensation, including, but not limited to, salary, 
stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization 
benefits; andshall not apply to non-compensatory issues 
including, but not limited to, job security, disciplinary 
procedures and actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues 
relating to eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be 
governed by other provisions proscribed by law.41 (emphasis 
added) 
The supporting memorandum by then Assembly Majority Leader Michael 
Bragman demonstrates that §209(4)(e) of the Act was not intended to exclude the 
negotiability of disciplinary procedures for members of the State Police: 
Sections 1 and 2 of this bill amend sections 209(2) and (4) of 
the civil service law, the State's binding arbitration law, to 
include members of the State Police. Section 3 of this bill 
limits binding arbitration to compensation issues (including 
such items as salary, overtime, vacation pay, etc.). Other 
issues will be subject to existing collective bargaining 
procedures.42 (emphasis added) 
40
 L 1995, c 432. 
41
 L 1995, c 432 §3. 
42
 New York State Bill Drafting Commission, Legislative Retrieval System, c432, 
Memorandum in Support of Bill No. A07370A (1995). 
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Majority Leader Bragman's reference to the "other issues" subject to existing 
negotiation procedures clearly refers to disciplinary procedures and other non-
compensation related issues that, although excluded from resolution at compulsory 
interest arbitration, remain negotiable under the Act. 
Six years later, in 2001, the Legislature eliminated the exclusion of police 
disciplinary procedures and other subjects from final resolution at interest arbitration for 
the State Police by repealing §209(4)(e) of the Act but retaining the grant of compulsory 
interest arbitration, in §§204(2) and 209(4) of the Act, for State Police negotiation 
impasses.43 The Assembly supporting memorandum for the 2001 amendment makes 
clear that the bill's purpose was to require members of the State Police to be treated in 
the same manner as local government police by permitting impasses over the subject of 
police disciplinary procedures, and other non-compensation related issues, to be finally 
resolved at compulsory interest arbitration: 
Local Police officers and Firefighters currently are afforded 
full binding arbitration (i.e. compensatory and non-
compensatory issues are subject to binding arbitration.) The 
legislation would simply grant all State Police officers equal 
treatment with respect to their local counterparts.44 
Although the Legislature, in the following year, reinstated the exclusion of 
43 L 2001, c 587. 
44
 New York State Bill Drafting Commission, Legislative Retrieval System, L 1995, c 
587, Memorandum in Support of Bill No. A8589 (2001). 
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disciplinary procedures45 from State Police compulsory interest arbitration, the plain 
meaning of the text and legislative history of the 1995, 2001 and 2002 amendments 
demonstrate a clear New York public policy choice that disciplinary procedures to be a 
subject of negotiations and mediation under the Act.46 
In support of its exceptions, the Town relies upon NYS Troopers PBA where the 
Court held that a police employee organization waived, in a negotiated agreement, the 
right of employees to be represented during a non-disciplinary critical incident review. 
Despite the Court's holding, the Town cites to the following dicta in that decision: 
While the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 200 et seq.) 
requires public employers to bargain in good faith 
concerning all terms and conditions of employment (Matter 
of City of Watertown v. State of N. Y. Pub. Empl. Relations 
Bd., 95 N.Y.2d 73, 78 [2000]), when legislation commits 
police discipline to the discretion of local authorities, as a 
matter of public policy, discipline is a prohibited subject of 
collective bargaining (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Assn. ofCityofN.Y., Inc. v. New York State Pub. Empl. 
Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 563 [2006])47 
According to the Town, this dicta demonstrates that the holding in NYCPBA does 
45
 L 2002, c 232. Section 209(4)(e) of the Act currently states: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of troopers,-
investigators, senior investigators, investigator specialists 
and commissioned or non-commissioned officers of the 
division of state police, the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to issues relating to disciplinary procedures and 
investigations or eligibility and assignment to details and 
positions, which shall be governed by other provisions 
prescribed by law. (emphasis added). 
46
 The Legislature's enactment of §209-a(1 )(g) of the Act in 2007, with respect to 
disciplinary procedures and collective negotiations, which does not exempt police 
officers from coverage, constitutes additional legislative recognition that disciplinary 
procedures are subject to collective negotiations and impasse procedures, in general 
under the Act for police and quasi-law enforcement personnel. L 2007, c 244. 
11 NY3d at 102, 41 PERB 117511 at 7543. 
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not distinguish between a special law and a general law. We disagree. While the Court's 
wording is broad, it is superfluous to the Court's holding that the employee organization 
in that case had waived the right to representation during a non-disciplinary critical 
incident review.48 
Similarly, we reject the Town's contention that the Court's reference in NYS 
Troopers PBA to a lower court decision,49 during its recitation of the procedural history 
of the various disputes between the parties, constitutes an affirmance of that lower court 
decision's holding that a general police disciplinary statute rendered the subject 
prohibited under the Act. In fact, a review of the briefs submitted to the Court 
establishes that the parties did not fully brief the issue of negotiability or present to the 
Court the relevant text and legislative history of the Act described herein, because the 
primary appellate issues were justiciability and waiver.50 
I n State of New Yor/c51 (Division of State Police) the Board held that Exec Law 
§215(3), a general law, renders State Police disciplinary procedures a prohibited subject 
of negotiations and that legal conclusion was confirmed by a lower court. In reaching its 
conclusion, however, the Board did not examine the text and legislative history of 
48
 See, Judge Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 
NYU L. Rev 1249, 1256-7 (2006). 
49
 State of New York (Division of State Police), 38 PERB1J3007 (2005), confirmed sub 
no/77. PBA of New York State Troopers v State of New York, 39 PERB 1J7013 (Sup Ct 
Albany County 2006) nor. 
50
 See, Police Benevolent Association of New York State Troopers, Inc v Division of 
New York State Police, Albany Co Index No. 522-06, Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Brief for Respondents and Reply Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants, on 
file with the Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals. 
Supra note 49. 
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§§209(2) and (4) of the Act, which provides the clearest articulation of public policy with 
respect to the negotiability of police disciplinary procedures. While the confirming court 
referenced §204(4)(e) of the Act as demonstrating that "even the Taylor Law expressly 
recognizes its own limitations,"52 the court may have misapprehended the precise nature 
of the limitation contained in the Act which, while excluding police disciplinary procedures 
from compulsory interest arbitration, does not establish a similar exclusion with respect to 
negotiations and mediation. In light of the centraiity of legislative intent in discerning New 
York public policy, we are not persuaded that the reasoning in State of New York 
(Division of State Police) supports a conclusion that Town Law §§154 and 155 preclude 
the negotiability of police discipline under the Act.53 
Finally, unlike the prefatory sections in RCPA and WCPA, which expressly 
exclude the applicability of other statutes or rules to the discipline of town police officers 
subject to those special laws,54 Town Law §155 expresses a clear legislative intent and 
public policy permitting police disciplinary authority to be subject to subsequent 
modification like the Second Class Cities Law provision analyzed in Albany. 
Town Law §155 states in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, no member or 
members of such police department shall be fined, 
reprimanded, removed or dismissed until written charges 
shall have been examined, heard and investigated in such 
manner or by such procedure, practice* examination and 
investigation as the board, by rules and regulations from 
52
 Supra note 49, 39 PERB 1J7013 at 7030. 
53
 However, we do not need to reconsider, in the present case, the issue of whether 
Exec Law §215(3) renders police discipline a prohibited subject under the Act as the 
Board held in State of New York (Division of State Police). 
54WCPA, §1;RCPA, §1. 
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time to time, may prescribe (emphasis added). 
Therefore, we conclude that Town Law §§154 and 155 do not render police 
disciplinary procedures a prohibited subject because they are general laws and Town 
Law §155 explicitly provides that its terms can be superseded by other provisions of 
law, such as the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Town's exceptions and affirm, as 
modified, the decision of the ALJ. 
C. The Town Did Not Repudiate the Negotiated Disciplinary Procedures In 
Violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act 
We next turn to the exceptions filed by the PBA challenging the ALJ's dismissal 
of its repudiation claim asserting that the Town did not have a colorable claim of right to 
implement the Local Law. 
It is well-settled that a meritorious repudiation claim arises only in extraordinary 
circumstances, where one party to an agreement denies the existence of an agreement 
or acts in total disregard of the negotiated terms without any colorable claim of right.56 In 
Village of Monroe,57 we reaffirmed that an arguable defense to a repudiation claim can 
be predicated on law, external to the Act, which requires a respondent to disavow the 
existence of a collectively negotiated agreement or a specific contract provision. In 
order to establish a colorable claim of legal right, however, a respondent must present a 
persuasive legal argument demonstrating that its actions may be required by external 
55
 In contrast, Town Law §153 does not contain the same prefatory language and it has 
been found to preempt negotiations over police longevity payments. See, Town of 
Mamaroneck PBA, Inc. v New York State Pub Employ Rel Bel, supra note 38. 
56
 Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 25 PERB fl3064 (1992). 
57
 40 PERB1J3013 (2007). 
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law. Such a defense will not be sustained unless the legal argument is well grounded in 
case law, statute or regulation. 
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Town established a 
colorable claim of right with respect to its unilateral action in implementing the Local 
Law. While we have rejected the Town's legal arguments that Town Law §§154 and 155 
render police discipline a prohibited subject, we conclude that the Town's mistaken 
interpretation of NYCPBA constitutes a colorable claim of right premised on external law 
sufficient to reject the PBA's repudiation claim.58 
D. The Proposed Remedial Order Is Not Inconsistent With §205.5 of the Act 
Finally, we deny the Town's exception challenging the ALJ's proposed order on 
the ground that the order purportedly violates §205.5 of the Act. The proposed order is 
well within PERB's authority to require the restoration of the status quo, along with 
make whole relief, to remedy violations of §§209-a.1 (a), (d) and (e) of the Act 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Town's exceptions, and the PBA's 
exceptions, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town of Wallkill shall forthwith: 
i . Cease the implementation of Local Law No, 2 with respect to the discipline 
of police officers who are in the PBA bargaining unit; 
2. Return to the contractual disciplinary procedures in Article 29 of the 
agreement between the Town and the PBA, which remain in effect 
pursuant to § 209-a.1 (e) of the Act; 
3. Rescind any disciplinary action taken against any unit employee pursuant 
to Local Law No. 2 without prejudice to proceeding under 
the contractual disciplinary procedures in Article 29 of the agreement; 
58
 County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERB1J3004 (1992), confirmed 
sub nom. 26 PERB 1J7004 (Sup Ct Rockland County 1993). 
Case No. U-27426 -21 -
Make whole any unit employee who sustained any monetary loss as a 
result of the Town's use of the procedure in Local Law No. 2, together with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations normally used 
by it to post written communications to unit employees. . 
DATED: July 23, 2009 
Albany, New York 
X/st^TrLK 
Jerome Lefkowitzf Chairman' 
Robert's. Kite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Wallkill in the unit represented by 
the Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent Association, Inc.(PBA) that the Town of 
Wallkill will forthwith: 
1. Cease the implementation of Local Law No. 2 with respect to the discipline 
of police officers who are in the PBA bargaining unit; 
2. Return to the contractual disciplinary procedures in Article 29 of the 
agreement between the Town and the PBA, which remain in effect 
pursuant to §209-a. 1(e) of the Act; 
3. Rescind any disciplinary action taken against any unit employee pursuant 
to Local LawNo. 2 without prejudice to proceeding under the contractual 
disciplinary procedures in Article 29 of the agreement; 
4. Make whole any unit employee who sustained any monetary loss as a 
result of the Town's use of the procedure in Local Law No. 2, together 
with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
on behalf of Town of Wallkill 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
